Hofstra Law Review
Volume 42 | Issue 3

Article 9

1-1-2014

Show Me the Mediation!: Introducing Mediation
Prior to Salary Arbitration in Major League
Baseball
Sam B. Smith

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, and the Entertainment, Arts, and
Sports Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Smith, Sam B. (2014) "Show Me the Mediation!: Introducing Mediation Prior to Salary Arbitration in Major League Baseball," Hofstra
Law Review: Vol. 42: Iss. 3, Article 9.
Available at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol42/iss3/9

This document is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact lawcls@hofstra.edu.

Smith: Show Me the Mediation!: Introducing Mediation Prior to Salary Arb

NOTE
SHOW ME THE MEDIATION!:
INTRODUCING MEDIATION PRIOR
TO SALARY ARBITRATION IN
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
I.

INTRODUCTION

It may seem contradictory in a world of winners and losers, but
there is room in the professional sports industry for a win-win style of
alternative dispute resolution ("ADR").' This Note's goal is to review
the quantitative and qualitative data to see if adding mediation prior to
arbitration could be more effective than Major League Baseball's
("MLB" or "league") current method of final-offer arbitration ("FOA"). 2
FOA is a specific type of arbitration hearing, where the arbitrator is
limited to choosing only one of the offers submitted by the parties, with
no other options available.3 Mediation, on the other hand, "is the
submission of a dispute to an impartial facilitator who assists the parties
in negotiating a voluntary, consensual settlement of their dispute."4 This
Note concludes that the current method of FOA used by MLB, although
effective at resulting in settlements, produces several critical problems.
These major problems should, and could, be fixed by introducing
mandatory mediation prior to arbitration.6

1. See discussion infra Part IV.
2. See discussion infra Parts III-IV.
3. Benjamin A. Tulis, Final-Offer "Baseball" Arbitration: Contexts, Mechanics &
Applications, 20 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 85, 86, 88-90 (2010) (distinguishing FOA in that
it "allows an arbitrator to make an unrestricted settlement choice without the prior submission of
offers by the disputants").
4. Adam Epstein, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Sport Management and the Sport
Management Curriculum, 12 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 153, 158 (2002) (describing the mediation
process).
5. See John P. Gillard, Jr., An Analysis of Salary Arbitration in Baseball: Could a Failureto
Change the System Be Strike Three for Small-Market Franchises?, 3 SPORTS LAW. J. 125, 131
(1996) (arguing that the current system of salary arbitration used in MLB has been successful in
settling salary disputes, despite fundamental flaws); infra Part HI.
6. See discussion infra Part 1V.D.
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Part II of this Note will discuss the history of FOA generally, as
well as the history and goals of FOA in MLB specifically. 7 It will also
outline the process of salary arbitration that MLB currently uses.8 Lastly,
it will briefly discuss the usage of ADR in the three other major
professional sports in the United States. 9
Part III will discuss the numerous consequences of FOA in general
and with respect to MLB. 10 These main consequences include a
weakened relationship between the player and the team, the effect on
small-market teams versus large-market teams, and the process being
more of a win-win for players than for owners. 1 A few other minor
effects include the uncertainty that results from a lack of written
metrics, or
decisions from arbitrators, and the complexity of advanced
"sabermetrics," utilized more frequently in recent cases. 12
Next, Part IV will propose a solution that would resolve these3
concerns by implementing mandatory mediation prior to arbitration.1
This Part will also discuss how mediation has been used elsewhere in
MLB. 14 Part V will conclude that, even with the competitive nature of
baseball, there is room for mediation prior to FOA. 15 The Appendix will
introduce a detailed schedule of how mandatory mediation can be
implemented into the already tight schedule of the MLB offseason.16

II. How FINAL-OFFER ARBITRATION CAME INTO
EXISTENCE IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL

The story of how FOA came to be used in MLB involves a history17
of labor relations in baseball spanning more than one hundred years.
7. See discussion infra Part H.A-C, ll.E.
8. See discussion infra Part II.D.
9. See discussion infra Part H.F.
10. See discussion infra Part HI.
11. See Vittorio Vella, Comment, Swing and a Foul Tip: What Major League Baseball Needs
to Do to Keep Its Small Market FranchisesAlive at the ArbitrationPlate, 16 SETON HALL J. SPORTS
& ENT. L. 317, 326-28 (2006) (outlining the criticisms of FOA, including disproportionately
favoring players, differences between the effect on large- and small-market teams, and much higher
salaries); infra Part I.A-C.
12. See Roger I. Abrams, Inside Baseball's Salary Arbitration Process, 6 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 55, 66 (1999) [hereinafter Abrams, Baseball's Arbitration Process] (defining
"sabermetrics" as "a player's contribution to his club's success"); Gillard, supra note 5, at 136
("[A]rbitrators do not issue written decisions. Because arbitrators do not need to support their
conclusions in writing, they can conceivably make their decisions based on factors not enumerated
in the collective bargaining agreement."); infra Part M.D.
13. See discussion infra Part IV.
14. See discussion infra Part lV.B.
15. See discussion infra Part V.
16. See infra Appendix.
17. See Josh Chetwynd, Play Ball? An Analysis of Final-Offer Arbitration,Its Use in Major
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To fully understand how and why salary arbitration was implemented in
the league, it is first necessary to generally explore the history of salary
negotiations, and then look particularly at the events and issues arising in
MLB before FOA was implemented via agreements between the players
and the owners. 18 More specifically, the hostility in the bargaining
practices of the owners and the players sheds light on why MLB utilizes
FOA and how such use has shaped the league today.1 9
A.

History of Final-OfferArbitration

The first proposed usage of FOA in the United States was for
preventing labor strikes. 20 The first person to provide serious insight on
the subject was economist Carl Stevens in 1966.21 He theorized that the
purpose and goal of arbitration should be to "encourage negotiated
settlements at a greater rate than conventional arbitration., 22 He
explained that parties prefer negotiated settlements much more than
decisions made by a third party, in this case an arbitrator, because the
ultimate decision is left to the parties. 23 Along with that, negotiated
settlements also allow the parties to 24avoid spending extra time and
money on the arbitration hearing itself.
During the subsequent decade, several states began to implement
FOA as a way of resolving labor disputes.25 Since then, numerous states
have used arbitrators to prevent public unions from striking.26 FOA was

League Baseball and Its PotentialApplicability to European Football Wage and Transfer Disputes,
20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REv. 109, 117-23 (2009) [hereinafter Chetwynd, Play Ball?] (outlining the
long labor history of professional baseball, from 1871 and the National League to the current use of
salary arbitration).
18. See discussion infra Part II.A-C.
19. See discussion infra Part II.B-C.
20. Chetwynd, Play Ball?, supra note 17, at 110. ("FOA was first proposed abstractly in the
United States in the late 1940s as a tool for preventing large-scale labor strikes ....
").
21. Id. at 110-11; Tulis, supra note 3, at 86 n.ll. See generally Carl M. Stevens, Is
CompulsoryArbitration Compatiblewith Bargaining?,INDUS. REL., Feb. 1996, at 38.
22. Chetwynd, Play Ball?, supra note 17, at 110-11 (discussing that proponents of FOA,
namely Carl M. Stevens, asserted that this was the system of arbitration's greatest value).
23. Id. at 111; see Stevens, supra note 21, at 46.
24. Chetwynd, Play Ball?, supranote 17, at 111.
25. Id. at 112 ("[B]y the early 1970s states and municipalities as well as Major League
Baseball had embraced the approach.").
26. See Vincent P. Crawford, Arbitration and Conflict Resolution in Labor-Management
Bargaining, 71 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROc.) 205, 205 (1981); see also Chetwynd, Play
Ball?, supra note 17, at 112 ("Wisconsin and Michigan[] instituted FOA as a form of compulsory
arbitration 'to resolve labor-management bargaining disputes when the union is legally prohibited
(as are, for example, many public employees' unions) from striking." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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able to accomplish its goal of inducing negotiation, as best demonstrated
by developments in those states in the early 1970s.27
Varying forms of FOA developed at this time, including the "issueby-issue" and "package" approaches.28 These techniques are mainly used
when there are numerous points of issue that are being bargained
between the parties. 29 Issue-by-issue arbitration "allows the arbitrator
more flexibility" in that the arbitrator is permitted to choose the offer of
either side on each individual issue, thus allowing each side to contribute
sections of the final contract or collective bargaining agreement. ° On
the other hand, under the rules of package arbitration, the parties "submit
an offer covering every issue in dispute, and the arbitrator chooses one
complete package or the other., 31 Issue-by-issue and package arbitration
were adopted by Michigan and Wisconsin, respectively, and both states
were successful in reaching settlements prior to arbitration.32 From then
on, various other states began using these techniques during collective
bargaining with public sector employees.33
27. Chetwynd, PlayBall?, supra note 17, at 113. For example:
In 1972, Michigan... found an immediate increase in negotiated settlements. Under
conventional arbitration, the parties settled thirty-nine percent of disputes after the
parties requested arbitration but before the arbitrator made a determination. With FOA,
that number increased to sixty-four percent. In Wisconsin, where... FOA was
implemented the total amount of imposed arbitration awards required was almost exactly
the same as those in Michigan. Despite the constraining nature of the package process,
the reviews in Wisconsin were positive.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
28. Id. at 112 (emphases omitted); see also Philip E. Garber, Compulsory Arbitration in the
Public Sector: A ProposedAlternative, 26 ARB. J. 226, 231-32 (1971).
29. See Chetwynd, Play Ball?, supra note 17, at 112 (defining both "issue-by-issue" and
"package" arbitration and when each method is used (emphases omitted)); see also Elissa M. Meth,
Note, Final Offer Arbitration: A Model for Dispute Resolution in Domestic and International
Disputes, AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 383, 394 (1999).
30. Chetwynd, Play Ball?, supra note 17, at 112; Tulis, supranote 3, at 94-95; see also Meth,
supra note 29, at 394 ("[T]he arbitrator has flexibility to create a balanced award ....[l]f there are
many issues in dispute, an arbitrator can balance the number decided in favor of each party.
.
31. Chetwynd, PlayBall?, supra note 17, at 112; Tulis, supranote 3, at 94.
32. Chetwynd, PlayBall?, supra note 17, at 113 (detailing how both Michigan and Wisconsin
were able to increase negotiated settlements due to implementing, respectively, issue-by-issue and
package FOA); see also Meth, supra note 29, at 391 n.45 ("Prior to the enactment of Michigan's
final offer statute, 40% of public sector employment cases submitted to an arbitrator settled before
the arbitrator announced an award. During a comparable period after Michigan enacted FOA, 70%
settled before an arbitrator announced an award." (citations omitted)). In the first few years of
Wisconsin's FOA program, only nine out of 173 negotiations were ultimately resolved by
arbitration. James L. Stem, Final Offer Arbitration-InitialExperience in Wisconsin, MONTHLY
LAB. REV., Sept. 1974, at 39, 40.
33. See Chetwynd, Play Ball?, supra note 17, at 113 ("In 2003, for example, Connecticut,
Iowa and Michigan reportedly used issue-by-issue FOA, while Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey and
Wisconsin embraced package FOA .. ");Crawford, supra note 26, at 205 (listing states where
compulsory arbitration systems were in use as of 1981); Timothy H. Howlett & Christina K.
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Over time, other arbitration structures appeared.34 These included
allowing "dual final offers," and using fact finders to evaluate each
party's offer. 35 Dual final offers allow each party to submit two offers
into arbitration, rather than just one, as in FOA.36 Several states have
used independent fact finders who evaluate each side's proposal, and
may even go as far as offering their own personal opinions
and suggestions to the arbitrator.37 However, this technique
includes drawbacks, such as the chilling effect resulting from
the arbitrators' tendencies to pick fact finders' proposals, and the
decrease in the perceived risk of arbitration, thus resulting in fewer prearbitration agreements.38
FOA has also been combined with various other types of ADR.39
An example of this can be seen in Wisconsin where a system was
implemented "in which the state's Labor and Industry Review
McDonald, Mandatory ArbitrationofEmployment Claims an Update, MICH.B.J., Sept. 2013, at 38,
40 (outlining Michigan's Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, which was implemented to "reduce
litigation over arbitration agreements," while keeping intact the mandatory arbitration of other
employment claims).
34. Chetwynd, Play Ball?, supra note 17, at 113; see, e.g., Tulis, supranote 3, at 99 ("In New
Jersey, Section 16 of the Employer-Employee Relations Act is unique in that it offers six variations
of arbitration from which parties may choose.").
35. Chetwynd, Play Ball?, supra note 17, at 113-14; Tulis, supra note 3, at 99 (describing
Section 16 of the Employer-Employee Relations Act, which allows for fact finders to make
determinations); see Gary Long & Peter Feuille, Final-Offer Arbitration: "Sudden Death" in
Eugene, 27 INDuS. & LAB. REL. REV. 186, 198 (1974) (discussing the dual final offer procedure in
Eugene, Oregon); Meth, supra note 29, at 396 (defining dual final offer arbitration, where each
party submits two offers to the arbitrators); see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1285(3) (2007)
("[T]he parties... may agree either to call upon the Maine Labor Relations Board for fact-finding
services with recommendations or to pursue some other mutually acceptable fact-finding
procedure ....).
36. See Long & Feuille, supra note 35, at 198; Meth, supra note 29, at 396 (concluding that
this technique has actually been shown to facilitate settlements due to the parties submitting
additional information in comparison with FOA).
37. Chetwynd, Play Ball?, supra note 17, at 114 ("Independent fact finders have.., been
employed by a number of U.S. state public sectors, including Iowa, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin.").
38. See Peter Feuille, Final-Offer Arbitration and Negotiating Incentives, 32 ARB. J. 203,
211-12 (1977) (discussing the decreased negotiation pressures under the fact finding procedure in
Massachusetts); Meth, supra note 29, at 396-97.
39. See, e.g., Haitham A. Haloush & Bashar H. Malkawi, Internet Characteristicsand Online
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 327, 345 (2008) ("By the same token,
given that no resolution can be guaranteed in mediation, arbitration is viewed, in this context, as a
backup effort to resolve disputes that parties fail to resolve in mediation. This hybrid process, which
falls between mediation and arbitration, is called mediation-arbitration or 'med-arb."'); Martin C.
Weisman, Med-Arb: The Best of Both Worlds, DIsP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2013, at 40, 40 ("The
combination of mediation and arbitration (Med-Arb) is an often-overlooked alternative dispute
resolution vehicle. Med-Arb is a hybrid mechanism in which the parties attempt to reach a voluntary
agreement with a third-party neutral first through mediation, and if that is not successful, through
arbitration."); see also Chetwynd, Play Ball?, supra note 17, at 114 (discussing the use of a hybrid
system in Wisconsin).
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Commission investigated the dispute, offered mediation if there was an
impasse, and then used FOA as a final option. 4 ° Some states also
provide an option to choose from the numerous forms of FOA listed
above.4 ' FOA has also been suggested in non-union related disputes.42
As it can be seen, there have been various developments to the process
of FOA since its inception in the late 1940s. 43
B. History of LaborNegotiation in Major League Baseball
FOA was first implemented in MLB in March 1973, after being
negotiated as part of the third Basic Agreement between the MLB
Player's Association ("MLBPA") and MLB. 44 Before the
implementation of FOA, MLB experimented with numerous other
methods of salary negotiations, which contributed to baseball's long
and contentious labor history.45 This history explains why FOA
is in existence today-to combat problems arising from salary disputes
in the past.46
Salary negotiations date back to 1871, when the National
Association of Professional Baseball Players, the baseball league
preceding MLB, began.47 MLB was formed shortly thereafter, in 1876.48
At that time, the maximum length of players' contracts was only one
year--ending at the conclusion of each season, at which point players
were free to sign with any other team that offered them a new contract.49
Owners grew weary of that system, arguing that the increase in salaries

40. Chetwynd, PlayBall?, supra note 17, at 114.
41. Id. New Jersey has a similar statute. See id. ("New Jersey's Employer-Employee
Relations Act gives parties a menu of six arbitration options, including five that use various forms
of FOA-from issue-by-issue to package FOA to hybrid approaches that utilize both forms.").
42. See Jason B. Shorter, Final-OfferArbitrationfor Health Care Billing Disputes: Analyzing
One State's ProposedDispute Resolution Process, 9 APPALACHIAN J.L. 191, 199 (2010) (discussing

California Senate Bill No. 981, which was proposed to provide a process where FOA could be used
to resolve insurance disputes that arise between insurers and physicians). California Senate Bill
No. 981 was vetoed by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger. Id.
43. See supra notes 20-42 and accompanying text.
44. Ed Edmonds, A Most Interesting Part of Baseball's Monetary Structure-Salary
Arbitration in Its Thirty-Fifth Year, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REv. 1, 3 (2009); Adam Primm, Salary
Arbitration Induced Settlement in Major League Baseball: The New Trend, 17 SPORTs LAW. J. 73,

80(2010).
45. Chetwynd, Play Ball?, supra note 17, at 117-22.
46. See id.
at 117-23.
47. See id. at 118 (discussing contractual arrangements in the early years of professional
baseball); Connie Mack & Richard M. Blau, The Need for Fair Play: Repealing the Federal
Baseball Antitrust Exemption, 45 FLA. L. REV. 201, 210 (1993) (discussing the creation of
professional baseball in 1971).
48. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 261 (1972) (providing an overview of the history of MLB).
49. See Chetwynd, Play Ball?, supra note 17, at 118.
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that players were being offered on the open market led to too much
player autonomy.5 ° As a result, fans of each team were constantly losing
their favorite players, who were being signed by other teams, and thus
lost interest in attending ballgames. 5'
This confluence of factors caused the team owners to sign a
"National Agreement" in 1879 that created "the reserve system," which
resulted in decreased salaries and less freedom to contract.12 Over the
next eight years, owners extended their ability to safeguard players by
increasing the maximum number of players that were protectable,
eventually to include an entire roster through amendment of the reserve
rule.53 At this time, the only options available to players were to play for
their current team for life, get traded, or quit baseball.54 Owners argued
that this system helped increase fan interest, while critics contended that
it was an unfair restriction on players' rights. 55
The players, for the reasons stated above, opposed that system, and
thus formed the National Brotherhood of Professional Ball Players ("the
Brotherhood") in 1885.56 This resulted in a higher minimum salary
because the players at this time threatened to start a new league. 7
However, the reserve system remained in place.58 Over the next
thirty or so years the players collectively bargained to form other

50. Id.
51.

JAMES B.

DWORKIN,

OWNERS

VERSUS PLAYERS:

BASEBALL

AND COLLECTIVE

BARGAINING 9 (1981).
52. Chetwynd, Play Ball?, supra note 17, at 118 (emphasis omitted); Mack & Blau, supra
note 47, at 208.
53. DWORKIN, supra note 51, at 10.
54. See Stephen F. Ross, Monopoly Sports Leagues, 73 MINN. L. REV. 643, 667 (1989);
Chantel D. Carmouche, Comment, Arbitration and Major League Baseball, I J. AM. ARB. 91, 93
(2001).
55. Compare William B. Gould IV, Labor Issues in Professional Sports: Reflections on
Baseball, Labor, and Antitrust Law, 15 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 61, 63 (2004) ("Owners believed
that a bidding war between competing clubs would disrupt continuity of play, deplete club finances,
confuse spectators, and distort competitive equity and balance."), with Ross, supra note 54, at 667,
669-70 (arguing that player restrictions actually harm fans and noting that "[c]ritics charge that the
restraints have no effect, positive or negative, on player allocation, and serve only to exploit the
players").
56. See ROBERT C. BERRY ET AL., LABOR RELATIONS IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 51 (1986)
(noting that the formation of the Brotherhood eventually led to the players forming their own
league); Chetwynd, Play Ball?, supra note 17, at 118-19.
57. Chetwynd, Play Ball?, supra note 17, at 119 (noting that the owners met the players'
demand for a higher minimum salary when the players threatened to form their own league).
58. See Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ewing, 42 F. 198, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1890) (denying an
injunction by holding that the reserve clause did not amount to a contract for the next season but
rather an agreement to negotiate a contract); see also Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 259 n.1 (1979)
(citing Metropolitan Exhibition Co., 42 F. at 202-04); Chetwynd, PlayBall?,supra note 17, at 119.
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associations, but none achieved the players' original goal-to end the
reserve system.59
One of the most important events in the context of players' salaries
took place in the 1922 U.S. Supreme Court decision in FederalBaseball
Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs.60 The Court ruled that professional baseball was "purely [a] state
affair[],' thus exempting MLB from the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.62
Since the Court ruled that there was no "commerce among the States,"
teams were still able to use the reserve system to prevent their players
from transferring teams.63 The Court extended its decision in 1953, when
it upheld the reserve system, and denied an attack under antitrust law in
Toolson v. N.Y Yankees, Inc.64 The Court explicitly ruled that "Congress
had no intention of including the business of baseball within the scope of
federal antitrust laws., 65 Most recently, in 1972, the Supreme Court
66
upheld the reserve system in Flood v. Kuhn.

59. See DWORKIN, supra note 51, at 12; Chetwynd, Play Ball?, supra note 17, at 119
(discussing the League Protective Players' Association and the Baseball Players' Fraternity, both of
which were unable to end the reserve system); see also ROGER I. ABRAMS, LEGAL BASES:

BASEBALL AND THE LAW 73 (1998) (discussing unsuccessful attempts at player unions in the thirty
years following the Brotherhood); Ross E. Davies, Along Comes the Players Association: The Roots
and Rise of Organized Labor in Major League Baseball, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 321,
325-31 (2013) (discussing the history of these organizations).
60. 259 U.S. 200 (1922); Chetwynd, Play Ball?, supra note 17, at 119 (discussing the
importance of this case); Gould, supra note 55, at 63 (stating that this case was a landmark
decision).
61. Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc., 259 U.S. at 208. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes stated:
The business is giving exhibitions of base ball, which are purely state affairs. It is
true that, in order to attain for these exhibitions the great popularity that they have
achieved, competitions must be arranged between clubs from different cities and States.
But the fact that in order to give the exhibitions the Leagues must induce free persons to
cross state lines and must arrange and pay for their doing so is not enough to change the
character of the business. According to the distinction insisted upon in Hooper v.
California,the transport is a mere incident, not the essential thing.
Id. at 208-09 (citation omitted).
62. See id at 207-09 (holding that professional baseball is outside of the scope of the antitrust
law); see also Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 356-57 (1953) (per curiam) ("In
[Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc.], this Court held that the business of providing public
baseball games for profit between clubs of professional baseball players was not within the scope of
federal antitrust laws."); Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 425 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
("(T]he unique exemption of Baseball from liability under the federal antitrust laws-an exemption
[was] conferred upon Baseball by the U.S. Supreme Court in [Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore,
Inc.] .... ").
63. Fed. Baseball Club of Bait., Inc., 259 U.S. at 209; Chetwynd, Play Ball?, supra note 17,
at 119 ('This decision implicitly affirmed the teams' right to use the reserve system.").
64. 346 U.S. 356, 357, 362-63 (1953).
65. Id. at 357.
66. 407 U.S. 258, 282-85 (1972).
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In 1954, between the rulings of Toolson and Flood, the MLBPA
was established.67 The most important addition to the MLBPA came in
1966, when Marvin Miller, the former chief economic assistant to the
United Steelworkers of America, was appointed executive director.68
Three years later, the National Labor Relations Board approved the
bargaining status of the MLBPA. 69 Then, in 1973, the owners proposed
the use of arbitration to help settle any salary disputes that would arise,
which was exactly what they had been rejecting for several decades. 70
Eventually, on February 25, 1973, the new collective bargaining
agreement was signed, which included a provision for salary arbitration
for eligible players.71
However, the reserve system still remained in place, concurrent
with the salary arbitration.72 This changed in 1975, when one player, Los
Angeles Dodgers pitcher Andy Messersmith, went against the reserve
system and entered into a grievance arbitration, arguing that the right of
renewal included in his contract only lasted for one year, not perpetually
as his team argued.7 3 The arbitrator sided with Messersmith; thus, every
player in the league with a renewal clause in his contract became a free
67. BERRY ET AL., supra note 56, at 52. Some negotiation between the players and the owners
took place in the following years, but nothing was done to the reserve system until years later.
Chetwynd, Play Ball?, supra note 17, at 121-22.
68. Chetwynd, Play Ball?, supra note 17, at 121; Michael J. Cozzillio, From the Land of
Bondage: The Greening of Major League BaseballPlayers and the Major League Baseball Players
Association, 41 CATm. U. L. REV. 117, 136 (1991) (reviewing MARVIN MILLER, A WHOLE
DIFFERENT BALLGAME: THE SPORT AND BUSINESS OF BASEBALL (1991)). Miller, as executive

director of the MLBPA, was able to "tripl[e] the pension fund, rais[e] the minimum salary from
$6,000 to $16,000, and more than doubl[e] the average salary to $40,956." Gould, supra note 55, at
66. The position was first offered to Judge Robert Cannon, but he declined it. Joshua P. Jones, Note,
A CongressionalSwing and Miss: The Curt FloodAct, Player Control, and the NationalPastime,
33 GA. L. REV. 639, 653 (1998). The United Steelworkers of America, the union that Miller left for
MLB, was the third-largest union in the United States. Chetwynd, Play Ball?, supra note 17, at 121.
69. Jonathan M. Conti, The Effect of Salary Arbitration on Major League Baseball, 5 SPORTS
LAW. J. 221, 226 (1998).
70. Id.; Robert A. McCormick, Baseball's Third Strike: The Triumph of Collective
Bargainingin ProfessionalBaseball, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1131, 1154 (1982).
71. Conti, supra note 69, at 226; McCormick, supra note 70, at 1154. In the same collective
bargaining agreement, players gained even more rights, such as the "ten and five rule." Gould,
supra note 55, at 66-67 ("[C]ollective bargaining in 1973 produced the so-called 'ten and five rule'
that allowed players with ten years of seniority and five years of service with one club to veto a
trade with which they disapproved.").
72. See Conti, supra note 69, at 227.
73. Id.(discussing how Messersmith challenged the reserve system by acting as a free agent
after the renewal clause his contract was fulfilled); McCormick, supra note 70, at 1155-56
(providing an in-depth overview of the Messersmith arbitration). Messersmith played the 1975
season for the Los Angeles Dodgers, after which he believed he was a free agent. Kansas City
Royals Baseball Corp. v.Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 532 F.2d 615, 618 (8th Cir. 1976).
However, every team in the league refused to sign him, so Messersmith invoked the grievance
arbitration provision. Conti, supra note 69, at 227.
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agent once the following season was over.74 Though the owners
challenged this decision in court, the court held that the arbitrator had
jurisdiction over the matter, and it would not act 75
as "an appellate tribunal
to review the merits of the arbitrator's decision.,
As a result of this landmark decision, the players and owners signed
the 1976 Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA"), which allowed
76
players to enter into free agency after six years of MLB service.
Following the court's decision, the owner of the St. Louis Cardinals,
Gussie Busch, complained, "[i]f anyone does not believe [the owners]
had our ass kicked in this labor matter, they are dead wrong., 77 Thus,
free agency in MLB began.78
Although salary arbitration was signed into effect back in 1973,
now, with the addition of free agency, the two processes combined
would help propel salary negotiations into the forefront of MLB. 79 The
owner of the Atlanta Braves, Ted Turner, went on to say to his fellow
owners regarding the effect of these changes over the years,
"[g]entlemen, we have the only legal monopoly in the country and we're
fucking it up."' 80 These statements by Busch and Turner show how
strongly the owners felt about the direction in which MLB was headed in
terms of contract negotiations.8 1
C. History of Final-OfferArbitration in MajorLeague Baseball
In 1974, the first salary arbitration litigation involving MLB took
place between Richard "Dick" Woodson and the Minnesota Twins.8 2
That year, there were twenty-nine arbitration hearings, where players
and their respective teams appeared before arbitrators and argued over

74. See Conti, supra note 69, at 227.
75. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp., 532 F.2d at 621. This has long been the policy for
settling labor disputes. United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960)
("The refusal of courts to review the merits of an arbitration award is the proper approach to
arbitration under collective bargaining agreements.").
76. MLB
Basic
Agreement,
art.
XVII(B)(2)
(1976-1979), available at
http://bizofbaseball.com/docs/1976CBARotate.pdf; see Conti, supra note 69, at 227-28.
77.

ED GAUS, BEERBALL: A HISTORY OF ST. LOUIS BASEBALL 175 (2001). Busch went on to

say, "[w]e have lost the war and the only question is can [the owners] live with the surrender
terms." Id.
78. Gould, supra note 55, at 69.
79. Conti, supra note 69, at 228.
80. HOWARD BRYANT, JUICING THE GAME: DRUGS, POWER, AND THE FIGHT FOR THE SOUL
OF MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 12 (2005).

81.

See supra notes 77, 80 and accompanying text.
ROGER I. ABRAMS, THE MONEY PITCH: BASEBALL FREE AGENCY AND SALARY
ARBITRATION 143 (2000) [hereinafter ABRAMS, THE MONEY PITCH]; Edmonds, supra note 44, at 1.
82.
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the players' salary for the upcoming season. 83 During the next two
offseasons, players who went through arbitration experienced an
increase in their salaries, even if they lost in the hearing. 84 In 1976, in
part as a result of this phenomenon, the owners locked out the players
during spring training. 85
The fourth Basic Agreement, which was signed in 1976 and ended
the lockout, altered salary arbitration so that players could only be
eligible for the arbitration if both the player and the team consented to
arbitration.86 Some other changes took place over the next decade,
including reducing eligibility for arbitration to only two years of MLB
service, which was then increased back up to three. 87 Also, an agreement
to end the 1990 lockout created the "Super Twos" category for salary
arbitration, discussed below.8 8 The next substantial change came in
2000, when MLB began to exclusively use the three-arbitrator panels
that it had gradually phased in over the previous five years. 8
Finally, since FOA was implemented in MLB, the type of arbitrator
chosen to sit on cases has changed. 90 Due to the extreme advancements
in statistical analysis in MLB over time, arbitrators selected to serve on
panels today have far more knowledge than their predecessors in the
advanced statistics often introduced in salary arbitration hearings. 91
83. Edmonds, supra note 44, at 2 ("[O]wners edged out the players by winning sixteen and
losing thirteen."); Thomas J. Hopkins, Arbitration: A Major League Effect on Players' Salaries, 2
SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 301, 312 (1992).
84. Edmonds, supra note 44, at 4. Whether or not a player "won" his hearing, his salary was
likely to be increased from the year before. See discussion infra Part II.C.
85. See PAUL D. STAUDOHAR, THE SPORTS INDUSTRY AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 42 (2d
ed. 1989); Edmonds, supra note 44, at 4 (discussing that the McNally-Messersmith arbitration
decision, and the general labor relations climate in baseball, resulted in a lockout).
86. See
MLB
Basic
Agreement,
art.
V(E)(3)
(1976-1979),
available at
http://bizofbaseball.com/docs/1976CBARotate.pdf; see also Edmonds, supra note 44, at 4.
87. See Edmonds, supra note 44, at 5 (discussing the 1980 and 1985 agreements).
88. See ANDREW ZIMBALIST, MAY THE BEST TEAM WIN: BASEBALL ECONOMICS AND
PUBLIC POLICY 85 (2003); Edmonds, supranote 44, at 5; infra note 95 and accompanying text.
89. Edmonds, supra note 44, at 6 (discussing that two hearings in 1995, half of the hearings in
1998, and the majority of hearings in 1999 were decided by panels, as opposed to sole arbitrators).
Roger Abrams, who has served as an arbitrator for MLB, wrote: "Comparing the experience with
my single arbitrator cases, I found no real difference, other than in the increased transaction costs
imposed on the arbitrators to meet after the hearing and review all the evidence together." Abrams,
Baseball's ArbitrationProcess,supra note 12, at 65. However, despite Abrams's beliefs, clubs have
favored arbitration panels, while players tend to favor a single arbitrator. Meth, supra note 29, at
400-01 ("[C]lubs considered a single arbitrator to be untrustworthy since he or she would be
motivated to... foster[] job security; a three-arbitrator panel, however,... would ensure neutral
decisions uninfluenced by employment concerns .... ").
90. See Abrams, Baseball's Arbitration Process, supra note 12, at 66. While discussing the
trend towards hiring an arbitrator based on his knowledge of MLB, Abrams noted that "[o]riginally
salary arbitrators were not selected on their knowledge of [MLB]." Id.
91. Id. Abrams provides an example of an early salary arbitrator:
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D. Process of Salary Arbitrationin MajorLeague Baseball
There are very specific rules that MLB follows for the salary
arbitration process.92 Only certain players are eligible for arbitration. 93
Any player with between three and six years of MLB service may
submit to binding salary arbitration, without the consent of the player's
team. 94 "Super Two" players are also eligible for arbitration.95
A player must provide written notice of submission to arbitration
by the filing date. 96 According to the most recent CBA, less than a week
after the filing date is the exchange date. 97 On the exchange date, the
MLBPA and the MLB Labor Relations Department ("MLBLRD")
exchange the proposed salaries for each side. 98 Players that do not apply
for arbitration become free agents, which allows them to sign with any
team that offers them a contract. 99 If the two sides reach an agreement
any time before the arbitration panel makes a decision, the matter is
withdrawn from arbitration.10 0 Cases are heard by panels of three
arbitrators, with one "panel chair" selected by the MLBPA and the
10 2
MLBLRD 01 The player and team split all costs of the hearing evenly.

There is a story told about a hearing involving a relief pitcher in the 1970s, when, after
hours of statistical presentation, the neutral asked: "Now what is a save?" Both sides
were dismayed, but carefully explained to the befuddled neutral the nature of a save. In
the process, of course, the parties realized their presentation of sophisticated statistics
wasted time and energy.
Id. ("Today, virtually all salary arbitrators are veterans of the process and have been schooled in the
game's parameters and statistics.").
92. MLB Collective Bargaining Agreement art. VI(E) (2012-2016) [hereinafter 2012 MLB
CBA], available at http://mlb.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba-english.pdf.
93. Id. art. VI(E)(1).
94. Id. art. VI(E)(1)(a).
95. Id. art. VI(E)(1)(b). The MLB Collective Bargaining Agreement, describing a "Super
Two," states that:
a Player with at least two but less than three years of Major League service shall be
eligible for salary arbitration if: (a) he has accumulated at least 86 days of service during
the immediately preceding season; and (b) he ranks in the top 22% (rounded to the
nearest whole number) in total service in the class of Players who have at least two but
less than three years of Major League service, however accumulated, but with at least 86
days of service accumulated during the immediately preceding season.
Id.
96. Id. art. VI(E)(2).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. art. VI(E)(3).
101. Id. art. VI(E)(5).
102. Id. art. VI(E)(9).
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The arbitration hearing itself is entirely confidential. 0 3 During the
hearing, each side is allotted one hour for an initial presentation,
followed by a half-hour rebuttal and summation by each side.' 4 All
written materials that each side plans to use in their case are exchanged
between the parties at the beginning of the hearing.'05
The evidence available to be used during the hearing depends on
certain criteria, which are defined as either admissible or inadmissible
evidence. 10 6 Admissible criteria include:
[T]he Player's contribution to his Club during the past season
(including but not limited to his overall performance, special qualities
of leadership and public appeal), the length and consistency of his
career contribution, the record of the Player's past compensation,
comparative baseball salaries . .

. ,

the existence of any physical or

mental defects on the part of the Player, and the recent performance
record of the Club including but not limited to its League standing and
attendance as an indication0 7 of public acceptance (subject to the
exclusion stated ... below).1

Inadmissible criteria include the financial position of the team or
player, press comments about the player, previous discussions during
salary negotiations, cost of representation, and salaries of persons in
other occupations.10 8 Under the CBA, "neither party shall carry the
burden of proof."' 0 9
Arbitration hearings are scheduled between February 1st and
February 20th, and decisions are almost always made within twenty-four
hours of a hearing.1 0 The salary awarded is limited to one of the figures
submitted by the player or the team, no amount in between." 1 The salary
103. Id. art. VI(E)(7); see also John E. Sands, Baseball Arbitration and 'Engineering' of
Effective Conflict Management, DisP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2007, at 10, 11.
104. 2012 MLB CBA, supra note 92, art. VI(E)(7). These rules are not followed too strictly.
See Abrams, Baseball's Arbitration Process, supra note 12, at 66 ("The time limits for the
arbitration hearing set forth in the agreement--one hour for each side followed by a half-hour
rebuttal-have been stretched in practice so that each party has a greater opportunity to rebut and
clarify.").
105. 2012 MLB CBA, supra note 92, art. VI(E)(7).
106. See id. art. VI(E)(10).
107. Id. art. VI(E)(10)(a); see also Abrams, Baseball's Arbitration Process, supra note 12, at
58 (noting that the CBA does not provide guidance as to how the arbitrators should weigh those
factors).
108. 2012 MLB CBA, supra note 92, art. VI(E)(10)(b); see Abrams, Baseball's Arbitration
Process, supranote 12, at 60.
109. 2012 MLB CBA, supranote 92, art. VI(E)(7).
110. Id art. VI(E)(13).
11. Id.; see also Edmonds, supra note 44, at 33 (discussing that the midpoint between two
offers will serve as a benchmark for the arbitrator). "If the panel thinks that the player is worth
$1.00 more than the midpoint, the panel chooses the player's figure. If the panel thinks the player is
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chosen by the arbitration panel then becomes that player's salary for the
upcoming season.' 1 2 Therefore, players who enter into FOA are not
capable of signing a multi-year agreement. 1 3 Similarly, those who are
awarded a salary through FOA will not be able to bargain for "such
ancillary rights as a no-trade clause, bonuses based on performance, or
additional tickets for family members or special travel
accommodations." ' 1 4 Lastly, there are no written opinions given by the
arbitration panel at any point.' 15
E. Goals of Final-OfferArbitration
FOA is classified as an "interest arbitration," which applies where
there is an argument over what terms to include in an agreement." 6 For
example, some disputed items that could be bargained for are wages,

insurance benefits, and other provisions typically found in employment
contracts." 7 While most interest arbitrations deal with collective
bargaining issues, FOA in MLB only deals with an individual player's
potential contract with his team, and not all of the players collectively." 8
In baseball, the contentious term to be included in the agreement is
exclusively the player's salary for the upcoming season." 9 The
worth $1.00 less than the midpoint, the panel chooses the team's figure." Edmonds, supra note 44,
at 33 (footnotes omitted).
112. Chetwynd, Play Ball?, supranote 17, at 124.
113. See Abrams, Baseball's Arbitration Process, supra note 12, at 62 (discussing the
advantages of settlement, including the possibility of a creative compensation package or multi-year
deal); Chetwynd, Play Ball?, supranote 17, at 124.
114. Chetwynd, Play Ball?, supranote 17, at 124 (footnote omitted).
115. 2012 MLB CBA, supra note 92, art. VI(E)(13); see also Abrams, Baseball'sArbitration
Process, supra note 12, at 60 (explaining that it is impossible to tell what criteria are used by the
arbitrators, as no written opinions are ever issued).
116. See Tulis, supra note 3, at 87, 95; see also Bryan M. O'Keefe, Comment, The Employee
Free Choice Act's Interest Arbitration Provision:In Whose Best Interest?, 115 PENN ST. L. REv.
211, 221-22 (2010) (discussing interest arbitration generally and FOA as a specific type of interest
arbitration). Interest arbitration most commonly involves going through one term or condition at a
time to be bargained for during the arbitration. See Tulis, supra note 3, at 87, 94.
117. See Tulis, supranote 3, at 87, 95; O'Keefe, supra note 116, at 222.
118. See Tulis, supra note 3, at 90 & n.14 ("Major League Baseball's collective bargaining
agreement process utilizes final-offer arbitration for one issue only: determining a player's salary.").
Interest arbitration is "rarely used in the private sector," besides in MLB. O'Keefe, supra note 116,
at 223-24. Some have even described the process as "un-American" and "an abrogation of
freedom." R.W. Fleming, Interest Arbitration Revisited, in ARBITRATION OF INTEREST DISPUTES 1,
I (Barbara D. Dennis & Gerald G. Somers eds., 1974) (discussing the differences between "rights"
arbitration and "interest" arbitration); see also Letter from R. Theodore Clark, Jr., Seyfarth Shaw
LLP, to Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, Rep. George Miller & Sen. Michael B. Enzi, Rep. Howard P.
McKeon (Feb. 13, 2009), available at http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/legacy/hillletters/090213arbitration.pdf (opposing the introduction of interest arbitration provisions of the
"Employee Free Choice Act").
119. See Abrams, Baseball'sArbitration Process,supra note 12, at 57.
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overriding goal of FOA is to circumvent the chilling effect by
incentivizing parties to avoid going to an arbitration hearing. 120 In the
context of arbitration or other forms of ADR, the chilling effect arises
when the two sides do not bargain in good faith because they have the
safeguard of a third party to settle the dispute somewhere between the
two proposed amounts. 12 1 If an arbitrator can pick any salary between
the two proposals, theoretically each side will be "less willing to make
concessions and more likely to take extreme positions so that the arbitral
'compromise' will be skewed in their favor," thus leading to more
22
arbitration hearings. 1
FOA helps to diminish this chilling effect by compelling the two
adversaries to give more reasonable offers to one another. 23 FOA only
enables the arbitrator-or arbitration panel-to pick one of the provided
offers, so there is no chance of a middle ground result. 124 For that reason,
"each party feels pressured to make a more reasonable offer," increasing
the likelihood that the parties will bargain in good faith. 25 The mere
threat of the arbitrator picking the other party's salary proposal poses a
significant risk to each side, which leads to an increased need to
negotiate in order to avoid going to arbitration. 26 In this way,

120. See Tulis, supra note 3, at 89; Meth, supra note 29, at 387-88; O'Keefe, supra note 116,
at 222.
121. Peter Feuille, Final Offer Arbitration and the Chilling Effect, 14 INDUS. REL. 302, 304
(1975) [hereinafter Feuille, Chilling Effect]; Tulis, supra note 3, at 88 ("[T]he existence of a
compromise can be seen as an obstacle to good-faith bargaining, based on the assumption that these
compromises cause a 'chilling' or 'freezing' effect on negotiations.").
122. See J. Joseph Loewenberg, Interest Arbitration. Past, Present, and Future, in LABOR
ARBITRATION UNDER FIRE 11, 118 (James L. Stem & Joyce M. Najita eds., 1997); Tulis, supra
note 3, at 88.
123. Feuille, Chilling Effect, supra note 121, at 304-05. Theoretically, if both sides know that
regardless of what salary they propose, the arbitrator is not forced to pick exactly one offer or the
other, but instead can pick any salary in between the two, there is less of an incentive to be
reasonable while bargaining. See Meth, supranote 29, at 387.
124. See Jeffrey Chicoine, A Critical Review of Collective Bargaining Dispute Resolution
Under the PECBA and Alternative Models, in OREGON PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING:
ENTERING THE THIRD DECADE 55, 68 (Howell L. Lankford ed., 1994); Feuille, Chilling Effect,
supra note 121, at 304-05 ("[FOA] attempts to increase the costs of disagreement by eliminating
arbitral discretion.... [T]he arbitrator must select one or the other final offer .... ").
125. Tulis, supranote 3, at 89; see Feuille, Chilling Effect, supranote 121, at 304-05.
126. Abrams, Baseball's Arbitration Process, supra note 12, at 62-63 ("By comparison, in
final-offer arbitration the best final position is the more reasonable one, the one closer to the real
market value, wherever that is .... Winning means being more reasonable, the key which unlocks
the door to settlement."); Conti, supra note 69, at 234; Meth, supra note 29, at 388 ("FOA does
seem to encourage reasonable offers; each side knows that the arbitrator is unable to compromise,
so each side is wary of making unreasonable offers that increase the chance that its opponent will
win at the hearing.").
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MLB has been very27 successful in preventing cases from reaching an
arbitration hearing. 1
Salary arbitration in MLB also helps to avoid "holdouts.' ' 128 A
holdout is where a player refuses to take part in any team-related
activities until he receives a contract that is satisfactory to him. 29 As
discussed below, holdouts occur in the National Football League
("NFL"), a major professional sports league in the United States that
does not have any form of salary arbitration in its CBA.130 Because 13
of
the implementation of FOA, holdouts are not possible in MLB. 1
Finally, FOA facilitates the resolution of salary disputes in a timely
manner, 32 and decreases the cost of dispute resolution, which makes it
more appealing to both players and teams. 133
F.

Other Forms of Dispute Resolution in ProfessionalSports

Arbitration has been implemented and used in each of the three
other major professional sports leagues in the United States: the National
Hockey League ("NHL"), the NFL, and the National Basketball
127. Tulis, supra note 3, at 90 ("In the 2009 salary arbitration season, 111 players filed for
arbitration, 46 players exchanged numbers with their respective teams, and only three of these
players continued to a hearing." (footnote omitted)). The 2013 offseason was the first time in MLB
history that every possible salary arbitration hearing was settled before appearing before an
arbitrator. Arbitration Ends with No Hearings, ESPN (Feb. 18, 2013, 2:26 PM),
http://espn.go.com/mlb/spring2013/story/_/id/8958928/mlb-players-pitch-first-arbitration-shutout39-year-history. The previous low of three hearings occurred in 2005, 2009, and 2011. Id.Teams
have begun to sign their arbitration eligible players to long-term contracts prior to hearings. See,
e.g., Edmonds, supra note 44, at 28-29 (discussing the "file-and-go" strategy in which some teams
refuse to negotiate after a certain date, and, thus, encourage the player to be more reasonable earlier
on during the bargaining process); see also ArbitrationEnds with No Hearings, supra.
128. Abrams, Baseball's Arbitration Process, supra note 12, at 72; Interview with Glenn
Wong, Professor, Isenberg Sch. of Mgmt., Univ. of Mass. Amherst, in Amherst, Mass.
(Apr. 5, 2011); Telephone Interview with Jim Masteralexis, Partner, DiaMMond Mgnt. Grp., LLC
(Apr. 1,2011).
129. See Sean M. Neary, Mediating ProfessionalAthlete Contracts in the Wake of Darrelle
Revis, 9 WILLAMET rE SPORTS L.J. 81, 91 (2011).

130. M61anie Aubut, When Negotiations Fail:An Analysis of Salary Arbitration and Salary
Cap Systems, 10 SPORTS LAW. J. 189, 190, 211 (2003) (pointing out that while MLB has salary
arbitration, the NFL instead employs a salary cap, with no option of arbitration for salary disputes);
Neary, supra note 129, at 83-84 (detailing the holdout of NFL defensive back Darrelle Revis); see
infra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
131. See Hopkins, supra note 83, at 331; Tulis, supra note 3, at 92 ("Appeals and player
holdouts are both prohibited under baseball arbitration."). There are no holdouts because a player
will either sign a new deal prior to arbitration, or his salary will be resolved by an arbitration panel
prior to spring training. Abrams, Baseball'sArbitrationProcess,supra note 12, at 72.
132. See ABRAMS, THE MONEY PITCH, supra note 82, at 146; Chetwynd, Play Ball?, supra
note 17, at126; Meth, supranote 29, at 412.
133. Chetwynd, Play Ball?, supra note 17, at 11; Meth, supra note 29, at 386; Tulis, supra
note 3, at I 11.
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Association ("NBA"). 134 However, the usage of arbitration varies from
league to league. 3 5 The NHL uses arbitration in a manner most similar
to MLB, in that it provides arbitration in salary disputes between a
player and a team.1 36 However, there are several key differences between
the styles of arbitration used by the NHL and MLB. 137 First, under the
NHL's system of arbitration, arbitrators may choose any dollar amount
between the offers submitted by the parties. 38 Second, arbitrators hand
down written decisions.'3 9 Third, unlike in MLB, where briefs are
exchanged immediately prior to the arbitration, in the NIIL, briefs
prepared by the parties are exchanged forty-eight hours prior to the
hearing. 40 Moreover, NHL teams have "walk-away" rights, which,
although rarely used, allow a team-with some restrictions-to reject an
arbitration award given to a player, resulting in the player becoming a
free agent.' 4' Two other minor differences in the salary arbitration
processes of the NHL and MLB are the inclusion of years
of eligibility
142
for players and which players can submit to arbitration.
The NBA and the NFL both use arbitration, but in ways that differ
from the forms of salary arbitration in MLB. 143 The NBA uses
arbitration for "general grievances over discipline, fines, etc."' 44 There is
no process in the NBA allowing for salary arbitration for players'
134. Epstein, supra note 4, at 162.
135. See id. at 162-63.
136. Seeid.
137. See infra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
138. Aubut, supra note 130, at 205, 211; Epstein, supra note 4, at 163.
139. Compare Aubut, supra note 130, at 211 ("NHL arbitrators must justify their decisions.
Thus, the NHL provides for a system of precedents on which the parties can rely in future cases."),
with Meth, supra note 29, at 393 (noting that there are no written decisions by arbitrators in MLB).
140. Aubut, supranote 130, at 211.
141. Stephen M. Yoost, Note, The NationalHockey League and Salary Arbitration:Time for a
Line Change, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 485, 517-18 (2006) (detailing the "walk-away rights"
of clubs); see also Aubut, supra note 130, at 206. M61anie Aubut asserts that:
in the event that the owner elects to reject the award, the player becomes a free agent. If
the player is unable to obtain a better offer from another team, he can then return to his
previous team and accept the offer that was last on the table prior to his becoming a free
agent.
Aubut, supra note 130, at 206. Pursuant to the NHL's CBA, teams may only exercise this right a
limited number of times. Id. ("Each club can exercise this right up to three times in two continuous
years and no more than twice in the same year.").
142. Aubut, supra note 130, at 201-03 (explaining how eligibility for salary arbitration depends
on the player's age and experience); Yoost, supra note 141, at 521.
143. See infra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
144. Epstein, supra note 4, at 163; see Jeffrey A. Mishkin, Dispute Resolution in the NBA: The
Allocation of Decision Making Among the Commissioner, ImpartialArbitrator,System Arbitrator,
and the Courts, 35 VAL. U. L. REV. 449, 453 (2001) ("The arbitrator usually gets the more routine
cases, for example, the cases of non-payment of obligations under player contracts, or bonuses,
clauses requiring players to maintain a certain weight, et cetera.").
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contracts. 145 Likewise, the NFL only allows for arbitration for non-salary
147
related disputes. 146 Instead, the NFL uses a salary cap system.
Notably, the style of arbitration
used by MLB is unique among
48
American professional sports. 1
III.

DRAWBACKS OF FINAL-OFFER ARBITRATION IN
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL

Since the implementation of FOA in MLB, there have been
drawbacks associated with the process. 149 Although many goals that
MLB sets out to accomplish through FOA have been achieved, the
process has serious flaws that should be addressed.' s° Examples of these
include the potential risk of damage to the relationship between the
player and his team, disadvantages to smaller-market teams versus
larger-market teams, as well as a few other issues to be discussed.' 5 '
A. Relationship Between Player and Team
The relationship between a player and the team's management is
vital in professional sports; there are countless examples of a player and
management having issues, which inevitably led to more problems down
the line.' 52 Those involved in the salary arbitration process have stated
145. Scott Bukstein, A New Solution for Salary Disputes: Implementing Salary Arbitration in
the NationalBasketball Association, 22 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 25, 29-30 (2011).
146. Epstein, supranote 4, at 163; see, e.g., Jeffrey D. Meyer, Note, The NFLPA's Arbitration
Procedure: A Forum for ProfessionalFootball Players and Their Agents to Resolve Disputes, 6
OHIO ST. J. ON DIsp. RESOL. 107, 111-12 (1990) (discussing that the NFL Players' Association
Regulations Governing Contract Advisors require players to resolve disputes with their agents by
arbitration).
147. Aubut, supra note 130, at 213, 216. In the NFL, once a player's contract is completed, a
player becomes either a restricted or unrestricted free agent, depending on his accrued seasons in the
league. Id. at 213-14. Players may also be tagged as "transition" or "franchise" players, depending
of certain circumstances. Id.at 214-15. Due to these factors, every player is either able to sign a new
contract with his previous team, sign a new contract with a different team, or is stuck with his
current team for another season under terms of a contract supplied by the NFL's CBA. See id at
213-15.
148. See supra notes 134-47 and accompanying text.
149. See infra Part HLI.A-D.
150. Compare supra Part H.B-E (discussing the history and goals of salary arbitration in
MLB), with infra Part HI.A-D (setting out the problems with salary arbitration in MLB).
151. See infra Part H1.A-D.
152. One recent instance was between Alex Rodriguez and the New York Yankees. Chris
Greenberg, Alex Rodriguez Tweets, Brian Cashman Reportedly Says A-Rod 'Should Just Shut the
F--- Up,' HUFFINGTON POST (June 25, 2013, 10:47 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2013/06/25/alex-rodriguez-cashman-shut-up-tweet_n_3499879.html.
Over
several
months,
Rodriguez and the New York Yankees' general manager, Brian Cashman, went back and forth over
issues arising from the Rodriguez had sustained over the season. Id. On June 25, 2013, following a
tweet by Rodriguez stating that he had been given "the green light to play games again," Brian
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that this relationship could be at risk after going through the arbitration
process.153 Due to the adversarial nature of this style of arbitration, there
is a large amount of negativity espoused by management regarding a
player. 5 4 This has caused players to become angry with their teams,' 55
and has resulted in players refusing to sign with their former team
in the future.' 56
In an arbitration hearing, the player's goal is to point out his
strengths; meanwhile, the objective of the team's management is to
highlight the player's weaknesses and inadequacies. 157 The player has to
sit through management "questioning his value to the team," and, thus,
the relationship between the two sides may become strained. 158 It is also
Cashman said in an interview that "Alex should just shut the f--- up." Id. (quoting Alex Rodriguez,
TWITTER (June 25, 2013, 6:22 PM), https://www.twitter.com/AROD/status/349668933797818368).
Another example of this relationship breakdown occurred with ex-NFL wide receiver Terrell Owens
and the Philadelphia Eagles. See Eagles Say Owens Won't Return This Season, N.Y. TWMES (Nov. 7,
2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/07/sports/football/07cnd-eagles.html. Within two years of
being traded to the Philadelphia Eagles, former coach Andy Reid, who at first suspended Owens for
one game, decided that Owens would not return the remainder of the season. See id. Reid stated that
the "decision [to suspend Owens] is a result of a large number of situations that accumulated over a
long period of time," including repeated clashes with management, contract disputes, and physical
altercations with teammates. Id.
153. Interview with Glenn Wong, supra note 128; Telephone Interview with Adam Cromie,
Dir. of Baseball Operations, Washington Nationals (Apr. 8, 2011).
154. Bibek Das, Salary Arbitration and the Effects on Major League Baseball and Baseball
Players, 1 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 58-59 (2003) ("[A] team can essentially
introduce evidence that may degrade a player and his accomplishments in the arbitration hearings.
However, since the player will likely be returning to the same team the following year, the team
may tend to hold back sensitive information which may offend the player."); Gillard, supra note 5,
at 135.
155. Telephone Interview with Jim Masteralexis, supra note 128 (explaining how some players
feel degraded and angered as an effect of salary arbitration).
156. Interview with Glenn Wong, supra note 128. There are several instances of this in the
NHL, where working relationships have been "irreparably damaged." Adrian Dater, NHL
Salary Arbitration Hearings an Old FashionedBruisefest, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 20, 2012,
12:52 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.con/2012/writers/adrian-dater/07/20/shea-weber-nhl-salaryarbitration/index.html. Some general managers have gone as far as to "get[] rid of players not long
after they filed for arbitration." Id. One example of this involved the New York Islanders
humiliating a player so much during an arbitration hearing that he refused to play the next season,
resulting in the Islanders having to trade the player. See Das, supra note 154, at 58.
157. See B.J. Rains, Players Reflect on Arbitration Hearings: Kyle Lohse, MLB TRADE
RUMORS (Feb. 19, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.mlbtraderumors.com/2013/02/arbitration-rewindkyle-lohse-beats-minnesota-in-2005-and-2006.html. Pitcher Kyle Lohse, who was involved in two
arbitration cases against the Minnesota Twins, described the process as follows:
They talk about how bad you are and why you deserve their number and everything
that's wrong with you and then your team has equal amount of time to pump you up and
say everything good about you. You're sitting there, 'Man I stink', and then, 'I'm the
greatest ever.'
Id.; see also Abrams, Baseball's Arbitration Process, supra note 12, at 65-66 (discussing the
presentation of statistics by each side in arbitration).
158. See Tulis, supra note 3, at 92.
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very common for players at arbitration hearings to "be offended by what
the owner has to say, potentially leading to a decline in production and a
request to be traded."' 59
Disputes between players and management-in both the NHL and
MLB-during salary arbitration highlight this concern.1 60 For example,
in one arbitration hearing, the NHL's management has been quoted as
saying, "can we agree that the linemates are the elephant, and player X is
the mouse?"' 161 Likewise, a professional hockey player wrote "I filed
with Pheonix [sic] and in their brief they called me the worst forward in
the NHL the previous year.' ' 162 Among the most egregious cases
occurred when, at an arbitration hearing, New York Islanders' general
manager, Mike Mulbury, "reduced Tommy Salo to tears with reasons
why the goalie didn't deserve his asking price."' 163 Likewise, the Director
of Baseball Operations for a MLB club stated that a player, who was
newly acquired by his team directly before going into salary arbitration,
was involved in an arbitration hearing that caused tension between that
player and the team.' 64 Once the arbitrator chooses the winner after the
hearing, the player remains signed to that team for the upcoming season;
thus, the relationship between the two must remain intact following the
65
arbitration process.

B. Small-Market vs. Large-Market Teams
Another major issue is the advantage that larger-market teams seem
to have over smaller-market teams when it comes to arbitration.166 An
arbitrator cannot take into consideration the financial position of a team
or that team's budget when making a decision. 67 Therefore, a team
located in a small market may not have the financial ability to keep a
player that is arbitration-eligible. 168 If a team cannot afford a player with
pending arbitration proceeding, that team may be forced to trade the
159. Gillard, supra note 5, at 135.
160. See infra notes 161-64 and accompanying text. As previously noted, the arbitration used
by the NHL is similar to that used by MLB. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
161.
162.

Dater, supranote 156.
Mike Johnson, TWITrER (July 10, 2012, 5:52 PM), http://twitter.conm/mike_pjohnson/

status/355082015579717634.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Dater, supranote 156.
Telephone Interview with Adam Cromie, supranote 153.
Tulis, supra note 3, at 92.
See infra notes 167-80 and accompanying text.

167. 2012 MLB CBA, supra note 92, art. Vl(E)(10)(b)(i)-(v). Therefore, because an arbitrator
may not consider a team's revenue during a hearing, a player should theoretically be awarded the
same salary regardless of the size of the market. See Aubut, supra note 130, at 236-37.
168. Aubut, supra note 130, at 237. Small-market teams have had to pay players more than
what the player is actually worth to the team. Gillard, supra note 5, at 134.
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player to a larger-market team with a higher payroll to maintain the
is a significant competitive advantage for teams in
player. 169 The result
70
1
markets.
larger
On a similar note, arbitrators are allowed to review the salaries of
comparable players during an arbitration hearing. 17 So when a player
goes to arbitration against a small-market team, a player is likely to use
the salaries of players who have been given contracts by larger-market
teams as a comparison. 72 Large-market teams are able to pay more for
certain free agents "because a free agent has the ability to produce more
revenue in a large-market than in a small one," which now places a huge
burden on these small-market teams to pay their arbitration eligible
an accurate appraisal
player a comparable salary. 173 However, this is not
174
of that player's value to a team in a small market.
Those involved in the management side of arbitration hearings have
stated that a lack of manpower and resources available to small-market
teams is a major issue.175 As discussed above, salary arbitration
negatively impacts the relationship between a player and a team. 176 To
avoid this, teams may choose to settle instead, thus maintaining a
positive relationship with the player even if settlement leads to a loss of
$25,000 to $50,000.177 Also, the amount of manpower required to
prepare for arbitration can be significant, possibly exceeding one

169. Aubut, supra note 130, at 237.
170. Id.; Gillard, supranote 5, at 134.
171. Gillard, supranote 5, at 133-34; Vella, supra note 11, at 328.
172. Gillard, supra note 5, at 134. A manager of an MLB team stated that, "because of the
arbitration process, my club is forced to pay New York and L.A. salaries, while the Club is located
in a totally different market." Id. at 134 n.63 (citing C. Raymond Grebey, Jr., Another Look at
Baseball'sSalary Arbitration, ARB. J., Dec. 1983, at 24, 27).
173. Vella, supranote 11, at 328, 336.
174. Gillard, supra note 5, at 134. The best way to illustrate this effect is though this example:
[A]ssume that ten million baseball fans live in New York City, one million baseball fans
live in Milwaukee, and Ken Griffey Jr. is a free agent. Also assume that the
entertainment that Griffey provides would cause one percent of the fans in either city to
attend ten more baseball games per year at $10 per game. If Griffey signed with the New
York Yankees, he would generate $10 million in additional revenues for the team per
year, and therefore the New York Yankees could sign Griffey for $10 million per year
without incurring a loss on the transaction. However, if Griffey signed with the
Milwaukee Brewers, he would only generate $1 million in additional revenues per year,
and any salary paid in excess of$1 million would cause the Brewers to incur a loss.
Id. at 134-35 (footnotes omitted). This is a clear, unfair advantage that larger-market teams have
over smaller-market teams due to the inability to introduce market size during an arbitration
hearing. See id.
175. See Interview with Glenn Wong, supra note 128; Telephone Interview with Adam
Cromie, supra note 153.
176. See supra Part ll.A.
177. Telephone Interview with Adam Cromie, supra note 153.
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hundred hours.1 78 Both of these concerns are more burdensome for
small-market teams because they have fewer resources to spend on the
case itself, and have less money to spend on finding outside counsel to
assist on a case. 7 9 Furthermore, the manpower required for arbitration
between February and December reduces the resources available
for other key offseason activities, such as offering contracts to
unsigned players, and scouting' 80 All of these factors demonstrate the
clear advantage that larger-market teams hold when it comes to
salary arbitration. 81
C. Win- Win for Players
FOA tends to benefit players far more than teams. 82 Regardless of
whether a player "wins" or "loses" in an arbitration hearing, his salary is
very likely to increase.183 For example, "from 1978-1985, if every salary
arbitration hearing was decided in favor of the teams, the average salary
increase would still have been 58% for the players."' 8 4 Even though
players only won 42.33% of arbitration hearings between 1974 and
2009, the salary of a player post-arbitration is significantly higher than
pre-arbitration. 8 5 In 2009, of the 111 players who filed for arbitration,
the average increase in salary was 143%. 186 Of approximately two
178. Interview with Glenn Wong, supranote 128.
179. Telephone Interview with Adam Cromie, supra note 153.
180. Id.
181. See supra notes 166-80 and accompanying text.
182. Vella, supra note 11, at 326.
183. Id. at 326-27 ("In 1993, players successful in [FOA] gained a 174% salary increase. That
same year, players who resolved their salary disputes before going to arbitration experienced a
110% raise in pay. Players who 'lost' their salary arbitration hearings averaged a 54% increase in
salary." (footnotes omitted)).
184. See Primm, supra note 44, at 107-08. This fifty-eight percent figure is a little deceiving
because there are other economic factors that could influence a player's salary, such as the market
forces of the league. Ethan Lock & Allan DeSerpa, Salary Increases Under Major League
Baseball'sSystem of Final Offer Salary Arbitration,2 LAB. LAW. 801, 806-07 (1986).
185. Primm, supra note 44, at 107-08, 112-13. For more context, between 1978 and 1985, of
the 143 players who filed for arbitration, there was an average increase in their salaries of 106.2%,
while all other non-arbitration eligible players had an increase in their average salaries of 22.9%.
Hopkins, supra note 83, at 312. Even if every player who went to arbitration lost, their salaries
would have increased by an average of fifty-eight percent. Id. at 313.
186. Chetwynd, Play Ball?, supra note 17, at 132; see Maury Brown, 2009 MLB Salary
Arbitration Vital Stats, BIZ OF BASEBALL (Feb. 20, 2009, 1:26 PM), http://www.bizofbaseball.coml
index.php?option=com-content&view--article&id=2974:2009-mlb-salary-arbitration-vital-stats&
catid=66:free-agency-and-trades&Itemid=153. During several of the seasons prior to2009, free
agents received lower salaries due to decreases in team revenues than those who went through
salary arbitration. Eldon L. Ham & Jeffrey Malach, Hardball Free Agency-The Unintended
Demise of Salary Arbitrationin Major League Baseball: How the Law of UnintendedConsequences
Crippledthe Salary ArbitrationRemedy-and How to Fix It, 1 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 63, 87
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thousand players that filed for arbitration through 1994, only nine
'' 87
players "suffered a drop in his salary from the previous season."
Pitcher Mike Norris, after losing at a salary arbitration, quipped, "I was
either going to wake up rich or richer."' 88 It is evident that players
are
89
owners.1
the
are
than
process
arbitration
MLB's
of
fonder
much
D. OtherProblems
MLB arbitration participants also note the lack of written decisions
by arbitrators as a flaw in the current system. 90 Written decisions would
help familiarize both players and teams with the criteria that arbitrators
focus on during a hearing.' 9' Decisions in writing would also establish
precedents for future arbitration hearings, which would likely help
accomplish the goal of avoiding an arbitration hearing.' 92 Since the team
and player would both be privy to the reasoning behind each ruling, each
party would be knowledgeable as to what arbitrators look for when
making future decisions. 193 This would also help to avoid any confusion
that could arise in the process, which stems from each party being
unsure of what factors the arbitration panel is likely to rely on or
(2010).
187. Chetwynd, Play Ball?, supra note 17, at 132; John L. Fizel, Play Ball: Baseball
ArbitrationAfter 20 Years, DisP. RESOL. J., June 1994, at 42, 45.
188. DAN HETTINGER, WELCOME TO THE BIG LEAGUES: EVERY MAN'S
SIGNIFICANCE: THE DARREL CHANEY STORY 104-05 (1994).

JOURNEY TO

189. See supranotes 182-88 and accompanying text.
190. Fizel, supra note 187, at 43 ("[N]o explanation can be given for the salary chosen.");
Vella, supra note 11, at 327 ("MLB Final Offer Arbitration rulings are neither written nor
explained .... "); Telephone Interview with Adam Cromie, supra note 153. This is one of the
biggest criticisms of baseball arbitration. See Gillard, supra note 5, at 136. The theory behind no
written decisions is that if the teams and players do not know the reasoning behind the arbitration
panel's decision, then going to a hearing may be too risky and unpredictable, thus leading to more
settlements. See Vella, supra note 11, at 327 ("[The] extreme difference between player and team
salary proposals makes Final Offer Arbitration an extremely unpredictable risk for players and
owners alike because both parties are uncertain as to which of their extreme proposals a panel will
choose.").
191. Gillard, supra note 5, at 136 ("A written decision would force arbitrators to make wellreasoned decisions, and the owners and players could adopt the criteria for arbitration decisions if
they found that the arbitrators were placing undue emphasis on certain criteria."). The lack of
written decisions especially hurts small-market teams, because they do not have the resources to put
aside in case the arbitrator awards an unpredictably high salary for a player with whom they go to
arbitration. Vella, supra note 11, at 327.
192. Ham & Malach, supra note 186, at 92 ("Every victory or loss in salary arbitration has
precedential value because the system focuses on comparables as the measure of a player's value.
However, in a system of law with no written opinions, parties are limited in what they can argue."
(footnote omitted)). Eldon L. Ham and Jeffrey Malach discuss three functions that written decisions
could have in baseball-disciplining judges, providing precedents, and legitimizing an arbitrator's
decision as non-arbitrary. See id.
193. Id.; Hopkins, supranote 83, at 333.
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ignore. 94 Most importantly, because there are no written decisions by
arbitration panels, it is possible that arbitrators are using factors that are
forbidden by the CBA, such as financial status of the team or statements
made by analysts about the player. 95 This is a cause of concern because
both the MLBPA and the owners collectively
bargained for certain
96
factors to be admissible or inadmissible. 1
A more recent issue is the increasing complexity of arbitration
hearings. 197 Both sides involved in hearings have begun to use teams of
98
statisticians to supplement their arguments with advanced metrics.'
Arbitrators have little to no time to comprehend all of the advanced
metrics being asserted by both parties because of the quick turnaround of
the hearings.' 99 This requires arbitrators to be strongly specialized-and
experts-in the specific fields of math and logic that parties are
including in their arguments. 20 0 Each of these consequences of FOA in

194. Frederick N. Donegan, Examining the Role of Arbitration in Professional Baseball, 1
SPORTS LAW. J. 183, 193 (1994); Hopkins, supra note 83, at 333 ("[T]he publication of an opinion
would provide a more realistic understanding of the arbitration process, and the reasoning behind a
decision.").
195. Gillard, supra note 5, at 136 (pointing out that it is conceivable, but not proven, that
decisions in the past have been made based on not only admissible criteria, but instead incorporating
factors not allowed under the CBA); see 2012 MLB CBA, supra note 92, art. VI(E)(10)(b)(i)-(v)
(listing the five main categories of evidence that are inadmissible in a hearing).
196. Conti, supra note 69, at 229. As an extreme example, some have criticized that there is
nothing in place right now that would stop an arbitrator from just flipping a coin to determine who
should win a hearing. Ham & Malach, supra note 186, at 93. This also allows room for the bias of
an arbitrator to go unnoticed. Id.
197. Donegan, supra note 194, at 193.
198. Id. This is illustrated best through the descriptions of Professor Abrams:
Today's salary arbitration hearing room table is adomed with laptop computers
capable of generating any needed comparison in an instant. Every claim is met with a
counterclaim until the arbitrators are left with a huge pile of numbers. Player
performance is chopped and diced, particularized and dissected. Anything not easily
convertible into numerical terms, such as team leadership, hustle and courage in the face
of debilitating injury, seems to play no role.
... Some salary arbitrators have been so overwhelmed by the numbers that they would
prefer if the parties would supply data long before the hearing so it might be digested.
... Stats are piled upon stats in rapid fashion.
See Abrams, Baseball's ArbitrationProcess, supra note 12, at 66. In the NHL, however, teams rely
on specialized law firms to represent them during salary arbitration hearings, due to the fact that the
statistics being introduced each year are becoming more and more complex. Aubut, supra note 130,
at 211 ("There are currently four preferred law firms available to represent NHL teams in arbitration
proceedings.").
199. See Abrams, Baseball'sArbitrationProcess, supra note 12, at 66.
200. See id. Some have suggested that arbitrators should "pass a 25-question examination
about baseball." JAMES T. GRAY, I SPORTS LAW PRACTICE, at 1-189 (3d ed. 2012). Another issue is
if one of the parties provides false information, such as an incorrect statistic, there is little to no way
for the arbitrator to realize this during the hearing. Abrams, Baseball's Arbitration Process,supra
note 12, at 67.
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MLB has an effect on the process in its own way. 20 ' The key is to either
minimize the influences of these factors by making adjustments
to the current process, or implement solutions that can remove these
negatives altogether.2 °2
IV.

IMPLEMENTATION OF MANDATORY MEDIATION IN MAJOR
LEAGUE BASEBALL

There are numerous methods of dispute resolution that are used to
settle differences of opinion-without requiring litigation-that could be
implemented in MLB.2 °3 These techniques are encompassed within the
subset of dispute resolution called ADR. 204 Arbitration and mediation
are two of the most well-known forms of ADR. 20 ' This Part will argue
that introducing mandatory mediation prior to the arbitration hearing
will correct many of the negative consequences of the FOA process
currently used by MLB. °6
A.

Mediation

Mediation is a form of ADR that is different than arbitration in
several ways.20 7 One difference is that the process of mediation "allows
for mutual satisfaction in the resolution, whereas imposed decisions
leave the parties at odds because there is typically a designated winner
and loser.,' 20 8 Imposed decisions are an integral part of both arbitration
hearings, as well as other forms of litigation. 20 9 A second difference is
that the goal of mediation is to make the solution a win-win for both

201. See supranotes 149-200 and accompanying text.
202. See infra Part IV.D.
203. Epstein, supra note 4, at 154-55; see, e.g., Gregory P. Mathews, Note, Using Negotiation,
Mediation, and Arbitration to Resolve IRS-Taxpayer Disputes, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 709,
723 (2004) (detailing the usage of ADR by the Internal Revenue Service).
204. Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1359, 1359-60, 1362 ("Alternative Dispute
Resolution (ADR) has been heralded as one of the most vital and far-reaching procedural reforms of
our time. Writers have praised [these] procedures, including. . . mediation, [and] arbitration ... as
offering speedy, non-intimidating, flexible justice for the common person .. " (footnote omitted)).
205. Id. at 1363; Epstein, supra note 4, at 155.
206. See infra Part W.C.
207. Delgado, supra note 204, at 1363-64.
208. Kathleen C. Wallace, A Proposalfor the United States Olympic Committee to Incorporate
FormalMediation Within Its Grievance Process, 16 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 59, 65 (2005); see also
Delgado, supra note 204, at 1363-64 ("In mediation, a neutral, noncoercive, nonadversarial third
party coordinates and facilitates negotiations between disputants. The mediator only encourages
settlement; the parties retain ultimate decision-making authority. Mediation is widely used in
resolving domestic disputes and consumer grievances." (footnotes omitted)).
209. Wallace, supra note 208, at 63.
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parties in the disagreement. 210 A third difference is that mediation "takes
into consideration the human toll 21of
conflict and fosters healthier
1
communication between disputants.

Mediation sets out to accomplish two goals in particular: the
preservation of working relationships and the quick resolution of timesensitive matters.212 Preservation of a working relationship can be
accomplished through the use of "private caucuses., 2 13 A private caucus
is where the mediator meets with each side privately, therefore avoiding
any damage done to the relationship which could possibly result from
direct, face-to-face communication between the player and management,
which is essential in a workplace, like MLB, where the relationship
between a player and his team is vital.2 14
Time sensitivity is key to any dispute resolution that could be
implemented in MLB, because there is only a finite amount of time
available during the offseason when teams and players can come to an
agreement on a contract. 2215 Mediation allows for the parties to use "preselection" of a mediator in order to save time, and the timetable can be

210. See Sarah Krieger, Note, The Dangers of Mediation in Domestic Violence Cases, 8
CARDOZo WoMEN's L.J. 235, 244 (2002) ("Mediation purports to alow its participants the
opportunity to discuss their situations, needs, and desires, and then an opportunity to reach a
compromise. The 'emphasis in mediation is placed on establishing a workable solution."' (footnotes
omitted)).
211. Wallace, supra note 208, at 65. That is one reason why mediation is more preferable than
going to court in domestic disputes. Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J.
29, 33 (1982).
212. See Peter B. Kupelian & Brian R. Salliotte, The Use of Mediation for Resolving Salary
Disputes in Sports, 2 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 383, 391-93 (1999); see also Delgado,
supra note 204, at 1366 ("[l]nformal dispute resolution mechanisms ... save[] both time and
money. ADR is less time-consuming than full-fledged adjudication because it eliminates many
formalities ofjudicial proof... because decisionmakers often are familiar with the subject matter of
the dispute .... (footnote omitted)).
213. Kupelian & Salliotte, supra note 212, at 391; see also Epstein, supra note 4, at 159
(describing how caucuses work); Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations,
Strategies, and Techniques: A Gridfor the Perplexed, I HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 7, 27 (1996)
[hereinafter Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations] ("[M]ost mediation activities take
place in private caucuses in which the mediator will gather additional information and deploy
evaluative techniques .... ").
214. Kupelian & Salliotte, supra note 212, at 391-92 ("For example, this would permit the
mediator to soften the general manager's tone in criticizing the player, and prevent the player [from]
hearing such negative commentary directly."). Even when there is face-to-face communication
between the parties, a mediator would be able to keep the conversation civil, to avoid any broken
relationships. Id. at 392; see also discussion supraPart 1hI.A.
215. See MLB Baseball 2011/2012 Calendar, AZCENTRAL.COM (Dec. 6, 2012,
4:09
PM),
http://www.azcentral.com/sports/diamondbacks/articles/2011/12/06/20111206mlbbaseball-calendar.html; see also Stephen B. Goldberg, The Mediation of Grievances Under a
Collective BargainingContract: An Alternative to Arbitration, 77 Nw. U. L. REV. 270, 282 (1982)
("[Mlediation would be substantially quicker ... than arbitration .... ").
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altered to meet the needs of the parties. 216 These mediation sessions are
even allowed to take place during the workday while employees are
actively working, which saves time for both the company and the
employees involved in the matter.21 7 Indeed, mediation is so effective, at
least in comparison to arbitration, because "the emphasis is less on the
[and] instead it is placed on the 'needs' of
lawyers and civil procedure,
' 218
the parties themselves.
Furthermore, there is not just one form of mediation; rather, there
are numerous varieties of the process. 2 19 Three major subsets of
mediation include facilitative, evaluative, and transformative
mediation.22 ° In facilitative mediation, the mediator is in charge of the
session, but the parties are in control of the outcome. 22' In evaluative
mediation, the mediator assesses each side's legal rights and arguments,
then directly states to the parties the likely outcome if the parties went to
arbitration or judicial hearing.222 Transformative mediation focuses on
repairing a damaged relationship between the parties, which may-and
hopefully will-lead to an agreement. 223
216. Kupelian & Salliotte, supra note 212, at 392 (describing "pre-selection" as having a
mediator hired for sessions that may come up in the future); see also Goldberg, supra note 215, at
276, 282 (noting that selecting an arbitrator could take up to forty days and that a mediator could be
selected to work on multiple sessions so it would be known in advance that a mediator is available).
217. Kupelian & Salliotte, supranote 212, at 392 ("Many large employers in the United States
have initiated similar mediation programs, and even allow the process to take place while
employees are still at work and on the clock.").
218. Epstein, supra note 4, at 155.
219. See Matthew Daiker, No J.D. Required: The Critical Role and Contributions of NonLawyer Mediators, 24 REv. LITIG. 499, 507-11 (2005); Neary, supra note 129, at 97-98 (describing
three different forms of mediation).
220. Daiker, supra note 219, at 507-11; Neary, supra note 129 at 97-98. Another newer
method is "narrative mediation," but this technique will not be discussed further in this Note.
Daiker, supranote 219, at 508 n.39 ("Incorporating much of the same logic as narrative therapy, a
narrative mediator uses story telling to work through conflict with the goal that eventually a new
story will develop where disagreement is replaced by resolution.").
221. Daiker, supra note 219, at 508-09; Neary, supra note 129, at 97-98; Zena D. Zumeta,
Styles of Mediation: Facilitative,Evaluative, and Transformative Mediation, MEDIATE.COM (Sept.
2000), http://www.mediate.com/articles/zumeta.cfin (stating that a facilitative mediator "is in charge
of the process, while the parties are in charge of the outcome").
222. Neary, supra note 129, at 98 ("The mediator here is more focused on the legal rights of
the parties...."); Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, supra note 213, at 27-28
(explaining that mediators "[a]ssess the strengths and weaknesses of each side's case," "predict
outcomes of court or other processes," "[p]ropose position-based compromise agreements," and
"[u]rge or push parties to settle or to accept a particular settlement proposal or range"); Nancy A.
Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-ConnectedMediation: The Inevitable
Price ofInstitutionalization?,6 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 27-28 (2001) (listing the strategies used
by mediators).
223. See Neary, supra note 129, at 98 ("The [transformative] mediation process is similar to
facilitative mediation, but focuses more on mending the relationship between the parties, with an
agreement as a by-product."); see also ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE
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Additionally, the mediator may take on different roles depending on
the situation.22 4 This ranges from a mediator as a passive actor, to a
mediator who acts as a leader.225 Once again, an important part of the
mediator having different roles is that it allows for flexibility in how the
mediator deals with a particular situation. 226
Finally, even if the mediation session is not successful in creating
an agreement between the two sides, progress will still have been
made.227 First, the parties have communicated, which will likely help
each side get a better handle on identifying the key issues.228 Second,
even if the mediation fails, there is still the safeguard of arbitration--or
some other form of dispute resolution-remaining to generate a
settlement, which will be helped along by the progress made during
mediation. 229 This is especially advantageous because courts are
extremely overcrowded and costly, and it will likely be in the best
interests of both parties to bypass the formal litigation process.230

PROMISE OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION
3-4 (1994) (explaining that a transformative mediator uses empowerment and recognition in order to
help the parties come to an agreement).
224. Josh Chetwynd, Clubhouse Controversy: A Study of Dispute Resolution Processes
Between Teammates in Major League Baseball, 16 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 31, 54 (2011)
[hereinafter Chetwynd, Clubhouse Controversy].
225. Id. (citing P. H. GULLIVER, DISPUTES AND NEGOTIATIONS: A CROSS-CULTURAL
PERSPECTIVE 214-17 (1979)). A passive mediator's main goal is solely to encourage the parties to
talk to one another to increase the flow of communication regarding the needs and wants of
everyone involved. Id. A mediator who acts as a leader is one who "asserts his own opinions and
recommendations." Id. A mediator acting as a leader emerges frequently when there are arguments
between players on the same team. Id. at 54-55. Usually for a person to act as a leading-style
mediator, that person is likely to be someone who is highly regarded in the locker room by his team
and commands respect from all of his teammates. Id. Most often, the team captain would
simultaneously serve as the team mediator for these locker room issues that frequently arise. Id. at
55.
226. See supranotes 219-25 and accompanying text.
227. See infra notes 228-30 and accompanying text.
228. Robert A. Baruch Bush, "What Do We Need a Mediatorfor?": Mediation's "ValueAdded" for Negotiators, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 1, 36 (1996) ("In mediation with this
approach, the value-added for negotiators is clear and simply stated: it enhances the quality of both
party decisionmaking and interparty communication, which themselves lead to better quality
outcomes-whether or not in the form of settlements."); Kupelian & Salliotte, supra note 212, at
396.
229. See David S. Winston, Note, ParticipationStandards in Mandatory Mediation Statutes:
"You Can Lead a Horse to Water .... "11 OHIO ST. 1. ON DISP. RESOL. 187, 190-91 (1996) ("Even
when parties fail to reach a settlement, the enhanced mutual understanding resulting from the
mediation process greatly improves the prospects for a later agreement.").
230. Epstein, supra note 4, at 155-56; Lucy V. Katz, Compulsory Alternative Dispute
Resolution and Voluntarism: Two-Headed Monster or Two Sides of the Coin?, 1993 J. DISP. RESOL.
1, 50; Winston, supra note 229, at 191-92 ("Even using the most conservative of these estimates, if
two of every ten cases bound for trial settle via mandatory mediation substantial savings in time and
money would accrue to the court system and the parties.").
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Although there are some circumstances in which certain techniques
of dispute resolution are most effective, these techniques need not be
mutually exclusive. 231 FOA has been combined with other ADR
techniques in numerous U.S. states.232 In Wisconsin, legislation has been
adopted that allows for municipal employees involved in collective
bargaining to avoid strikes by submitting both to mediation and binding
arbitration.233 In Maine, public employers during collective bargaining
must "participate in good faith in mediation.., and mediationarbitration procedures. 234 There has even been a federal bill proposed to
allow for mediation to facilitate collectively bargained agreements.235 In
2012, the Bowers v. Raymond J. Lucia CoS. 23 6 court upheld the
enforceability of an agreement between two parties who contracted to
mediate in a mediation-arbitration, an FOA technique.2 37 In this process:
(1) the parties would go to mediation; (2) if they could not reach an
agreement, they would then submit their final offers to the mediator; and
(3) the mediator would pick one of the offers. 238 All of these options
clearly illustrate that mediation does not need to be a stand-alone method
of dispute resolution.239
B.

Current Usage of Mediation in Major League Baseball

While it may not be so apparent, the process of mediation has
actually been used in MLB for years, just not for salary arbitration.2 4 °
Many teams use mediation as a way to settle disputes between players
that arise in the clubhouse. 24' These disputes have even escalated to
231.

See, e.g., THE HANDBOOK OF NEGOTIATION AND CULTURE 275 (Michele Gelfand &

Jeanne Brett eds., 2004) (discussing "arbitration-negotiation" and "arbitration-negotiationmediation"); Haloush & Malkawi, supra note 39, at 345 (explaining the process of mediationarbitration); Weisman, supranote 39, at 40 (discussing the hybrid mechanism of "Med-Arb").
232. Chetwynd, Play Ball?, supra note 17, at 114 ("Combining FOA with other forms of
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms is also a technique used by some states in the United
States.").
233. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.77 (West 2002 & Supp. 2013).
234. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1285 (2007).
235. See, e.g., Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, 111 th Cong, § 3 (2009). This
Act was sponsored by Representative George Miller of California-with 231 cosponsors-but was
never enacted. See id
236. 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 64 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012).
237. Id.at 67, 71. The agreement provided that, "[t]he Parties shall then proceed to a
mediation/binding baseball arbitration with a mutually agreed-upon neutral within sixty days of the
execution of this agreement." Id. at 67.
238. Michael P. Carbone, Binding Mediation/BaseballArbitration, MEDIATE.COM (July 2012),
http://www.mediate.com/articles/CarboneMO.cftn.
239. See supra notes 231-38 and accompanying text.
240. See Chetwynd, Clubhouse Controversy, supra note 224, at 53-58.
241. Id.at 53-56. These disputes range from serious issues, such as physical altercations and
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physical confrontations between players.242 In order to remedy these
situations, mediation has been the ADR technique most often used by
players within the clubhouse.243 If something as small as taste in music
can cause such angst in the locker room, which it has been known to do,
then it is clear that problems spurring from contract negotiations and
salary arbitration will likely also bring negativity into the clubhouse. 2 "
Mediation has also been
used for circumstances outside of the realm of
245
players.
between
issues
C. The Proposal
This Note proposes that MLB add a two-week period immediately
following the date on which salary arbitration figures are exchanged,
where a salary arbitration eligible player who has yet to sign a new
contract with his team would attend at least one mandatory mediation
session with that team.246 If the player and the team are not able to come
to an agreement during the mediation, they would be welcome to attend
another session until either a contract is agreed upon or the parties
go to a salary arbitration hearing.247 This would keep the rest
of the MLB offseason exactly the same, avoiding any potential
scheduling conflicts.248

hazing, to somewhat minor conflicts, for example, clubhouse etiquette mainly involving music
being played in the locker room. Id. at 37-43.
242. See id at 40-42; Michael Farber, Clubhouse Confidential: When a Bunch ofAlpha Males
Get Together Daily in a Confined Space, Lots of Things-Good and Bad-Can Happen, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 14, 2002, at 62, 69 (explaining that the most common point of contention
between MLB players in the locker room is regarding music). For example, Cleveland Indians'
outfielders Chad Curtis and Kevin Mitchell once got into a physical altercation over rap music.
Chetwynd, Clubhouse Controversy, supra note 224, at 41.
243. Chetwynd, Clubhouse Controversy, supra note 224, at 53.
244. See supra notes 242-43 and accompanying text.
245. See, e.g., Ken Gumick, Mediator Appointed in Dodgers-Fox Dispute, MLB.COM (Nov.
12, 2011, 3:53 PM), http://Iosangeles.dodgers.mlb.com/news/aticle.jsp?ymd=20111121&content_
id=26018756&vkey-=news mlb&c id=mlb. In 2011, a federal mediator was used to help settle a
dispute between the Los Angeles Dodgers and Fox Broadcasting Co. ("Fox") regarding
broadcasting rights. Id. The argument between the two sides involved a bankruptcy hearing for the
Dodgers, which Fox objected to, in order to force compliance by the Dodgers with the broadcasting
contract that the two sides agreed upon in the past. Id The two parties were able to avoid litigation,
instead allowing a federal mediator to meet with officials from each side, "with authority to settle."
Id
246. See infra Appendix.
247. See infra notes 298-301 and accompanying text.
248. See infra Appendix.
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D. Effects of Implementing Mandatory Mediation
Any new dispute resolution process, whether replacing, or merely
supplementing, FOA in MLB, must address the problems with the
current system. 249 Mandatory mediation does just that-it helps
minimize the likelihood of a strained relationship between the player and
the team; eliminates the gap between large- and small-market teams in
terms of the consequences of the arbitration process; and makes the
process less of a win-win for the players.250 In addition, mandatory
mediation would address other minor weaknesses of FOA, such as
limiting contracts to merely one season and avoiding the rules of
evidence required by the CBA. 251 Finally, by implementing mandatory
mediation, MLB would still have FOA in place if the mediation sessions
did not resolve the parties' disputes.2 52
1. Improved Relationship Between the Player and the Team
Mandatory mediation would help repair the relationship between
the player and his team leading up to and following an arbitration
hearing.2 53 The adversarial nature of FOA tends to have a negative
influence on the rapport between the two sides involved.2 54 Mediation,
on the other hand, uses a third party, who has limited authoritative
power, to help the two sides voluntarily reach a mutually acceptable
agreement.2 55 Because the settlement is not forced and is mutually
agreed upon-as opposed to being decided solely by the arbitrator in
FOA-the two sides are more likely to be satisfied with the result. 256 It
is vital that the parties are able to come to an agreement voluntarily, and
249. See supra Part fl.
250. See infra Part IV.D. 1-4.
251. See infra Part IV.D.4.
252. See infra Part IV.D.4.
253. See supra Part HI.A.
254. Interview with Glenn Wong, supra note 128 (explaining how players may become upset
through the arbitration process).
255. See, e.g., FLA. R. FOR CERTIFIED & COURT-APPOINTED MEDIATORS 10.310 (2010)
("Mediation is a process to facilitate consensual agreement between parties in conflict and to assist
them in voluntarily resolving their dispute."); see also Robert B. Moberly, Ethical Standardsfor
Court-Appointed Mediators and Florida'sMandatory Mediation Experiment, 21 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 701, 711 (1994); Wallace, supra note 208, at 63 (defining mediation as "an extension ... of
the negotiation process that involves intervention of a ... third party who has limited (or no)
authoritative decision-making power").
256.

See CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR

RESOLVING CONFLICT 8 (2d ed. 1996) ("Mediation... involves the intervention of an acceptable
third party who... assists the principal parties in voluntarily reaching a mutually acceptable
settlement of the issues in dispute."); Kupelian & Salliotte, supra note 212, at 399 ("As long as the
mediator is respected by all parties involved and has a sound understanding of the necessary
elements of the situation at hand, a mutually beneficial settlement can be reached.").
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although the proposed mediation sessions would be mandatory, it would
not be obligatory for the sides to reach an agreement during the
mediation session.257
Another way in which mandatory mediation could help avoid the
risk of a weakened relationship is the role of the mediators themselves in
the negotiations in actively fixing the relationship between the two
sides.258 Professional mediators are "specifically trained in interpersonal
skills, conflict analysis, and problem solving," while, conversely, an
arbitration panel merely listens to each side's argument and makes a
ruling based on the evidence, without adding anything else to the
process. 259 Rather than deciding who is right and who is wrong, the role
of the mediator is to help to identify the issues and discover the interests
of the parties, all while removing as much conflict as possible.2 60 By
opening up and promoting communication between the parties in a nonadversarial environment-rather than the ownership belittling the
achievements of the athlete during his time on their team-there can be
respectful discussions regarding a fair and reasonable salary for next
season, which could make the relationship between the two sides better
than it has ever been.2 6'
Lastly, if mediation accomplishes the goal it sets out to achievenamely, getting a settlement between the two sides and avoiding FOAit will spare the player the anguish of having to hear what his team
would say about him during the arbitration hearing.262 As discussed
257. Kupelian & Salliotte, supra note 212, at 384-85 (stating that mediation promotes
"voluntary agreements by the parties to [a] dispute," otherwise known as "self-determination").
While the process may be mandatory to attend, the parties would still keep their ability to determine
an outcome by themselves. See Moberly, supra note 255, at 711 (noting that "mediators are
prohibited from coercing a settlement").
258. MOORE, supra note 256, at 18-19; Kupelian & Salliotte, supra note 212, at 391-92;
Riskin, UnderstandingMediators' Orientations, supra note 213 at 27; Wallace, supra note 208, at
65 ("Mediation can repair and foster critical relationships among athletes, coaches, and governing
bodies.").
259. See Wallace, supra note 208, at 65 (describing the dynamic that professional mediators
can bring into a situation where the parties in the past have been unable to resolve an ongoing
dispute); 2012 MLB CBA, supra note 92, art. VI(E)(5) (creating the framework of arbitrators'
obligations).
260. See Wallace, supra note 208, at 65 ("[Mediators] have a repertoire of tools for
deescalating conflict, identifying interests and issues, mining for relevant information and feelings,
creating options that meet the needs of parties, and bringing parties together in order to come to
agreement.").
261. CompareGillard, supra note 5, at 135 (discussing how in arbitration hearings, teams need
to point out the negatives of the player's statistics over the course of his career), with Wallace, supra
note 208, at 65 (highlighting how mediation encourages communication and collaboration by all of
the parties involved).
262. See Gillard, supra note 5, at 135; Tulis, supra note 3, at 92 ("In an arbitration proceeding,
the player would have to witness his team's management questioning his value to the team.").
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earlier, the objective of management is to point out their own player's
inadequacies, 263 and the player, who is mandated to attend the hearing,
might be offended by what the owner has to say.2 4 Mandatory
mediation would encourage the parties to avoid arbitration altogether,
and, thus, will help to circumvent any risk of damaging the relationship
between the two parties.265
A player that goes through the entire arbitration procedure will still
be under contract the next season with the same team against whom he
faced in arbitration; therefore, it is of the utmost importance to make
sure the player is happy with management.2 66 As a result of settling prior
to arbitration, the player can avoid having to deal with the discomfort of
the ownership "questioning his value to the team., 267 It will also help
maintain a possible long-term relationship between the player and the
team if the two sides decide to sign a multi-year contract in the future.268
2. Equalizing the Consequences of FOA on Small-Market and
Large-Market Teams
The next problem that mandatory mediation would fix is the
discrepancy between large- and small-market teams when it comes to the
consequences of FOA. 269 Because an arbitrator cannot take into
consideration the financial position of a team--or that team's budgetwhen making a decision,270 and players may use salaries of comparable
players in their arguments during arbitration
hearings,27 1 teams in small
272
markets are at a severe disadvantage.
This issue could be resolved by allowing the parties to take part in a
mediation session prior to going to arbitration. If submitted to mediation,
there would be no rules of evidence-implemented by the CBAforbidding and permitting only certain subject matters to be brought up

263. Gillard, supra note 5, at 135; see supra Part M.A.
264. Gillard, supra note 5, at 135.
265. Cf supra Part III.A (describing how the relationship between a player and his team is at
risk when going through arbitration).
266. Abrams, Baseball's Arbitration Process, supra note 12, at 62; Chetwynd, Play Ball?,
supranote 17, at 124; Tulis, supra note 3, at 92 n.21 ("A player will remain on the team unless he is
traded ...").
267. Tulis, supranote 3, at 92.
268. See supraPart M.A.
269. See supra Part hI.B.
270. 2012 MLB CBA, supranote 92, art. VI(E)(10)(b)(i)-(v).
271. Vella, supranote 11, at 328.
272. Gillard, supra note 5, at 134 ("[S]mall-market teams are forced to sign players for an
amount greater than their value to the team, thus forcing teams to incur a financial loss."); see supra
Part I.B.
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by either side.273 For example, if, instead of going to a FOA hearing, the
two sides went to mediation, the player and the team would have more
factors that they can discuss to display the player's value to the team.27 4
These discussions could include criteria that are expressly prohibited by
the CBA, such as the finances of the team, stadium attendance
since the player joined the team, public opinion of the player, and
leadership abilities.275
Both sides would benefit from the ability to pick and choose which
of these-normally prohibited-elements help their case.276 Smallmarket teams would be able to reasonably inform their player thatwhile a certain player of his caliber is receiving a higher salary in a large
market-this team can only afford to pay him a smaller amount, but
would be able to retain him if he enjoyed playing in that city. 277 On that
same note, a player who is a clubhouse leader and fan favorite could
bring up these factors to persuade management that he deserves a higher
salary than someone of his caliber who does not exude the same
personality. 78 Therefore, both the player and the team could benefit
from the availability of these arguments; meanwhile, small-market teams
would have a better chance of retaining a player who they would
otherwise likely have to trade if given an arbitration award outside of
their price range.279
3. Mandatory Mediation Creates a Perceived Win-Win Situation
for Players and Teams
The major issue for owners is that they have seen FOA as being a
win-win only for players.28 ° Owners witness the salaries of players who
273. See 2012 MLB CBA, supra note 92, art. VI(E)(10)(a); Tulis, supra note 3, at 117-20
(laying out the various admissible and inadmissible criteria in baseball arbitration); see also
VALERIE F. BUTLER, MEDIATION: ESSENTIALS AND EXPECTATION 41 (2004) ("It's quite possible

for folks to get more in mediation than they would at trial, in part because there are no rules of
evidence to keep you from considering information from any reliable source."); Ronald G.
Wiesenthal, Dick and Jane Go to Mediation: A Primerfor the Less ExperiencedLawyer, 62 J. MO.
B. 72, 74 (2006) ("There are no rules of evidence in a mediation ....
").
274. See BUTLER, supra note 273, at 41; Wiesenthal, supra note 273, at 74.
275. See 2012 MLB CBA, supra note 92, art. VI(E)(10)(a); Tulis, supra note 3, at 118-20
(laying out the various inadmissible criteria in baseball arbitration).
276. See infra notes 277-79 and accompanying text.
277. Sands, supra note 103, at 11; Tulis, supra note 3, at 118.
278. Abrams, Baseball's Arbitration Process,supra note 12, at 60 ("The parties also prohibit
their arbitrators from considering media comments about players. If a player performed well based
on his statistics, that will tell his story, not the columns of local sports writers.").
279. See Aubut, supranote 130, at 237 ("This forces small market teams with correspondingly
small budgets to lose some of their players as they cannot afford to pay their salaries; the player is
then traded to a team that can.").
280. See Fizel, supra note 187, at 45; Primm, supra note 44, at 107-08 ("Salary arbitration is a
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go through arbitration increase by a large amount a majority of the
time. 281 However, in reality, salary increases stemming from FOA are
not outrageous; they are merely a reflection of the fair market value of a
player of a certain caliber.282 Because players in their first two to three
years do not really have any bargaining rights against the owners, their
salaries are relatively low in comparison to what they could be making
on the open market. 283 It only seems like a win-win for players because
the systems prior to FOA in MLB history did not allow players to make
their fair market value known at any point in time.284
Mediation could help owners utilize a process that is not solely a
win-win for players. Rather, mandatory mediation creates a win-win for
both sides. 285 Teams are facilitated in avoiding the entire arbitration
process altogether, through offering long-term contracts to younger
players in order to bypass all of the years that the player is arbitrationeligible.286 Players are unable to obtain a multi-year contract through
arbitration due to the rules of the CBA.2 87 However, through mediation,
a team and a player may sign a multi-year contract which would allow
each side to avoid the risk of having to go through arbitration at all.28 8
There has been a new trend of players signing long-term contracts to
avoid arbitration altogether, which would be promoted even further by
the institution of mediation, because it would help to settle more disputes

win-win for players, but this is not an unfair result for owners, because players are underpaid in
their first three seasons."); Marc Chalpin, Comment, It Ain t Over 'Til It's Over: The Century Long
Conflict Between the Owners and the Playersin Major League Baseball, 60 ALB. L. REV. 205, 233-

34 (1996).
281. See Primm, supra note 44, at 107-08; Jeff Passan, Phillies Maintain Power Grip on
Howard, YAHOO! SPORTS (Nov. 25, 2008, 10:17 PM), http://sports.yahoo.com/news/phillies-

maintain-power-grip-howard-031700380--mlb.html.
282.

See Fizel, supra note 187, at 45; Primm, supra note 44, at 107 ("The logical result of any

increase in bargaining power that will allow players to receive a salary closer to their fair market
value is that the salary will increase whether they win or lose the arbitration.").
283.

See Primm, supra note 44, at 107-08 (explaining that because players are underpaid

throughout their first three seasons, the increase in salary following arbitration makes owners view
the system as being a win-win for the players).
284. Fizel, supra note 187, at 45; Primm, supra note 44, at 108.
285. NORA DOHERTY & MARCELAS GUYLER, THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO WORKPLACE
MEDIATION & CONFLICT RESOLUTION 164 (2008); MEDIATION IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY:

AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW 101 (Penny Brooker & Suzanne Wilkinson eds., 2010).
286. Abrams, Baseball's Arbitration Process, supra note 12, at 56 ("To avoid salary
arbitration, some clubs have offered their junior star performers multi-year contracts at premium
rates."); Primm, supra note 44, at 109 ("[T]eams began to counter arbitration by signing players to
contracts for multiple years ...to avoid having to go through the negotiations and arbitration
process every year.").
287. Chetwynd, Play Ball?, supra note 17, at 124 (explaining that MLB's CBA only allows for
one-year deals resulting from arbitration).
288. See Tulis, supra note 3, at 89-90.
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prior to an arbitration hearing, thus allowing for these multi-year
deals. 28 9 This practice would help the player obtain the security of
having a multi-year contract with his team, and the ownership would
have a young, presumably high-quality, athlete "locked-up" for
numerous years. 290 Most importantly, both sides now can avoid the
inherent uncertainty of FOA, resulting in benefits for each side, as
discussed earlier.29'
4. FOA Remains a Fallback Option
The last major contribution that mediation could bring to baseball is
that it does not alter the current format to the extent of creating any new
controversies. If mandatory mediation was implemented in MLB, it
could be put into action in conjunction with the current format of
FOA.292 As discussed earlier, there are a number of situations where
states and private organizations have used a process of mediationarbitration.293 Many states have statutes that combine mediation and
arbitration by first mandating mediation sessions, and then, if there is no
settlement induced by mediation, using FOA as "a final option. ' 294 This
creates a "duty to bargain ...in good faith" as stated in the statute.295
Currently in MLB, there is no duty to bargain in good faith, besides the
risk that FOA imposes on each side to provide a reasonable offer.296
Mediation would help compel each side to come together and submit
realistic salaries to one another, through creating this duty to bargain in
297
good faith.
Moreover, even if the two sides are not able to come together to
reach an acceptable settlement during mediation, the right to go to
arbitration still remains.298 As seen in the state statutes discussed above,
289. See, e.g., Kupelian & Salliotte, supra note 212, at 386 ("Mediation typically has a success
rate which alone makes it a worthwhile endeavor.").
290. See, e.g., Edmonds, supra note 44, at 20-21, 23-24 (explaining why the St. Louis
Cardinals and the Tampa Bay Rays signed their marquee players, Albert Pujols and Evan Longoria,
respectively, to long-term deals); Primm, supra note 44, at 104-05 (detailing how the Florida
Marlins signed their young superstar Hanley Ramirez to a long-term deal).
291. See supra Part lI.D.
292. See supra Part IV.A
293. Chetwynd, Play Ball?, supra note 17, at 114 (detailing several situations where states
have used multiple forms of ADR, such as mediation and arbitration); see, e.g., ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26, § 1285 (West 2007); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.77 (West 2012); see also supra Part W.A.
294. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1285; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.77; Chetwynd, Play Ball?,
supra note 17, at 114.
295. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.77.
296. See Tulis, supra note 3, at 89. See generally 2012 MLB CBA supra note 92 (containing
no mention of the parties having to bargain in good faith).
297. See supranotes 294-96 and accompanying text.
298. Comparesupra Part.IV.D. I (describing the relationship between the player and team after
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when implementing mandatory mediation, arbitration is still available to
settle the dispute afterwards. 299 The statute only requires that the two
sides come together at some point in an effort to come to an agreement,
with the safeguard of arbitration as a last resort. 300 As a result, if
mandatory mediation was placed into the offseason schedule prior to the
arbitration hearings, either side would still have the right to bring the
dispute to an arbitration panel following mediation.30 '
V.

CONCLUSION

Although there is certainly a competitive nature to baseball, there
are obvious problems with FOA that could be fixed by moving to a
dispute resolution method of mandatory mediation prior to arbitration.30 2
By implementing a mediation-arbitration model into the CBA, it would
require a large shift in how players and owners view their relationship as
a whole.30 3 While FOA may accomplish the goal of compelling
settlement between parties,3°4 it does so while damaging the relationship
between the player and his team, impairing fairness between large- and
small-market teams, making owners feel like the process is a win-win
for players, and causing other aforementioned problems.30 5 All of these
problems can be resolved by the introduction of mandatory mediation
prior to arbitration.30 6

going through the arbitration process), with supra notes 294-95 and accompanying text (discussing
two state statutes that deal with mediation prior to arbitration).
299. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1285(4)(B) ("If the parties have not resolved their
controversy by the end of that 45-day period, either party may petition the board to initiate
compulsory final and binding arbitration of the negotiations' impasse."); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 111.77(3) ("Where the parties have no procedures for disposition of a dispute and an impasse has
been reached, either party may petition the commission to initiate compulsory, final and binding

arbitration of the dispute.").
300.
301.

See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.77.
See supra notes 298-300 and accompanying text.

302.

See discussion supraPart IV.D.

303. See Epstein, supra note 4, at 163. It would "force these parties to agree that they are
partners in a multi-billion dollar industry rather than adversaries." Id.
304. See Chetwynd, Play Ball?, supranote 17, at 110-11; Stevens, supra note 21, at 56; Tulis,
supra note 3, at 89.
305. See discussion supraPart III.
306. See discussion supra Part IV.
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APPENDIX - PROPOSED SCHEDULE
Nov. 1-13, 2013: General managers/owners meetings
Nov. 20: Reserve lists for all Major and Minor League levels filed
Dec. 2: Tender deadline
Dec. 9-12: Winter meetings
Jan. 14, 2014: Salary arbitration filing
Jan. 17: Salary arbitration figures exchanged
Jan. 18-31: Mandatory mediation sessions
Feb. 1-21: Salary arbitration hearings
Feb. 25: Mandatory reporting date
Mar. 2-11: Teams may renew contracts of unsigned players
Mar. 12: Last day to request unconditional release waivers (and pay
30 days termination pay)
Mar. 26: Last day to request unconditional release waivers (and pay
45 days termination pay)
Mar. 31: Opening day
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